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The former-Soviet states that make up Central Asia are among the most challenging 
group of countries to understand in the twenty-first century geopolitical and geoeconomic 
context. As one of the last of the world’s frontiers, much of this region’s energy potential 
in oil and natural gas has yet to be tapped or, even, b  found; and the region’s strategic 
position make Central Asia a significant region for energy markets and global affairs. The 
last few decades in Central Asia have been shaped by the determination to develop their 
energy sectors with a balance between attracting foreign energy firms and preserving its 
authority over its energy assets. States have also struggled to protect their sovereignty 
over their political and economic affairs from militant, nationalist or sectarian groups as 
well as from great powers like Russia and China. 
 
In spite of its many challenges, Central Asia has mny opportunities to develop those 
institutions, regional relationships and positive economic and political practices that will 
promote a productive energy sector and a thriving economy. Central-Asian states must 
achieve its goals of establishing an energy policy that secures prosperity for all, 
promoting productive energy relations with all Central-Asian states, reducing undue 
foreign influence but promoting foreign cooperation that benefits Central-Asia’s global 
relationships, and establishing peace and stability that protect energy infrastructure, 
production and exports.  
 
The future of Central-Asian energy relations can take many different paths and is 
dependent on the fate of its neighbors Russia, Afghanistan, South Asia and Iran. Russia’s 
needs for Central Asia’s neighbors to become unstable or inhospitable to energy 
development, but peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan can open new markets for Central 
Asia; and changes in Iran can unlock new opportunities to ship oil and gas to Western 
 vi 
markets around Russia. For all that the region has endured since independence, the world 
should apply greater value on this region as its energy prowess and strategic importance 
make Central Asia an influential player in twenty-first century global relations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background Information 
INTRODUCTION : CENTRAL ASIA’S ENERGY POTENTIAL AND CURRENT REALITIES  
The events in Central Asia no longer resemble a “great game” between great 
powers. The countries that make up this region have been struggling to establish total 
autonomy over their energy affairs. The production and export of oil and gas is the 
dominant economic activity in Central Asia, and contr l of the energy sector is the 
gateway to power in this region. For much of the last century, the Soviet Union forced its 
will on the region and recovered oil and gas for the benefit of Moscow. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union, new independent states emerged and no longer needed Moscow to 
develop its resources. 
Though the region may have become politically independent, geography, history 
and economics obstruct this landlocked region from becoming absolutely free. Energy 
pipelines that serve as the only main way for state to export oil and gas predominately 
travel through Russia, which purchases Central-Asian energy at cheap prices and sells it 
at a significant markup abroad. For much of the last twenty years, Russia also has 
manipulated global energy dynamics to prevent Central-Asian expansion into foreign 
markets, like China or Europe. At the same time Central-Asian states have failed to 
overcome Russian schemes against the region; in fact, K zakhstan and Turkmenistan had 
acquiesced to Russian pressure and made deals with the country at a considerable 
disadvantage to the region, as Chapter 2 discusses. In addition, the poor governance, 
inefficiency and volatility threaten to weaken the region’s energy potential and its future 
prosperity, as Chapter 3 explains. 
Recently, however, Central Asia has shown that it can surmount from its past and 
from its mistakes and become a free and strong partner in global energy relations. 
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Chapter 4 shows that Central-Asian states have to achieve certain goals to become 
prosperous and sovereign over its energy affairs. They need to work together to reduce 
corruption, to make the region safe for development and export, and to cooperate with the 
international community in good faith to promote energy diversification that would 
reduce reliance on Russia and increase overall economic revenue. From the last few 
years, most notably among their relationships with C ina, Central-Asian states have 
achieved much success and have fulfilled many of their mutual goals. 
Continuing on this track can potentially can lead this region into unprecedented 
heights, and future global trends can further bolster this region’s global prospects. The 
futures of Russia, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran will greatly impact Central Asia; 
but their futures are uncertain. Chapter 5 outlines various scenarios for the countries that 
surround Central Asia how future events in each area can have profound effects for 
Central Asia’s future. This chapter makes no attempt to predict future events, but shows, 
through explaining the interaction between Central Asia and the world, that this region 
will be a crucial factor in this century’s geopolitics and geoeconomics. 
Being one of the world’s last frontiers, the world has only begun to understand 
Central Asia. Though not a complete account, this paper attempts to contribute to the 
growing literature on Central-Asian energy developments and on analyzing what the 
future holds for this enchanting part of the world. Regardless of how the world develops 
in the twenty-first century, Central Asia will contribute greatly to shaping its future. 
GEOLOGY  
This section is intended to show some of the findings from the United States 
Geological Survey, including research from Gregory Ulmishek, and others on the energy 
reserves in Central Asia and the potential of this region in becoming a global leader in oil 
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and gas production. This section is not intended to escribe all technical features of the 
region’s geology but to show the region’s future potential as a global source of energy. 
North Caspian Basin 
Presently, The North Caspian Basin comprises of 500,000 square kilometers and 
has experienced less evaluation and production compared to other oil and gas regions in 
the former Soviet Union; however, this basin has become known as a very valuable base 
of oil and gas resources. According to Ulmishek, it comprises of a “shallow northern” 
area of the Caspian Sea and extends onshore between he Volga and Ural rivers and also 
eastward towards the Mugodzhary Highland on the Ural foldbelt.1 After the collapse of 
the USSR, most of this basin is located in present-day Kazakhstan.2 Ulmishek also states 
that, in the center portions of the basin, “sedimentary succession of the basin” is over 20 
km thick, which potentially could be a source of a substantial amount of future oil and 
gas.3 
As of 2001, Ulmishek states that the North Caspian B sin has discovered reserves 
of around 19.7 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and 157 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. 
In Kazakhstan, these resources are located in the Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan 
fields in the northern parts of mainland Kazakhstan and in Kazakh sections of the 
Caspian Sea.4 Ulmishek states further that the Northern and Western margins of the basin 
have been noted as having a “hydrocarbon column” of 1,600 meters, making it one of the 
                                                 
1 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 1-2. 
2 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 3. 
3 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 1. 
4 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 1-2. 
 4 
“thickest in the world.”5 In the southern margins where the supergiant Kashagan is 
located, it has become a critical area of importance for future oil and gas recovery, and 
much remains to be seen from this area. Vast potential remains for the discovery of 
further “medium-sized” oil and gas fields for the nxt few decades as technology 
improves.6  
North Ustyurt Basin in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
From Ulmishek’s research, the North Ustyurt Basin stretches from the Caspian 
Sea in southern Kazakhstan to the Aral Lake in Kazakhst n and Uzbekistan, consisting of 
around 250,000 square kilometers.7 The oil and gas rich locations are separated in three 
areas, or “petroleum systems,” having, in sum, 2.4 billion barrels of oil and 2.4 Tcf of 
natural gas.8 The Jurassic and younger strata have been the source f most of the drilling 
in the basin, and the offshore areas of the basin have yet to be explored.9 Ulmishek 
believes that much of the remaining oil and gas that remain unfounded will likely be 
located in the western portions of southwestern Kazakhstan along the Buzachi Peninsula, 
near the border with Turkmenistan, as technology improves.10 
                                                 
5 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 21. 
6 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Caspian Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Russia.” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/B/b2201-b.pdf, p. 22-23. 
7 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Ustyurt Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/D/b2201-d.pdf, p. 1, 3. 
8 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Ustyurt Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/D/b2201-d.pdf, p. 2. 
9 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Ustyurt Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/D/b2201-d.pdf, p. 2-3. 
10 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the North Ustyurt Basin, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan” United States Geological Survey. 2001. http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/D/b2201-d.pdf, p. 3. 
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Amu Darya Basin and Afghan-Tajik Basin Provinces in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan 
Amu Darya basin is located southwestern Central Asia within Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan with portions reaching Iran and Afghanistan.11 The USGS in 2011 updated 
their assessment of the Amu Darya Basin and the Afghan-Tajik Basin in southern areas 
of Central Asia. Based on these new reports, the Amu Darya Basin consists of over 
417,000 square kilometers of area and the smaller Afghan-Tajik Basin is over 97,000 
square kilometers of area.12 Both basins were likely created from “compression and 
deformation” in the late Paleogene to Neogene periods with the “collision of India with 
the Eurasian continent.”13 These two basins have been explored well, and geolo ists have 
found oil and gas traps throughout many formations, but not all of the area has been fully 
explored, especially in areas with significant relief.14 The USGS reports that the current 
estimated volume of undiscovered technically recoverabl  resources in the Amu Darya 
basin is over 52 Tcf of gas, 962 million barrels of oil and 582 million barrels of natural 
gas liquids.15 This data reveal that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ill have great potential 
to be an oil and gas export leader even beyond their proved reserves. 
                                                 
11 Ulmishek, Gregory F. “Petroleum Geology and Resources of the Amu-Darya Basin, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.” United States Gological Survey. February 2006. 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2201/H/pdf/B2201H_508.pdf, p.1. 
12 “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan–Tajik Basin 
Provinces, Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 2011.” United States Geological 
Survey. 2 February 2012.  http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3154/report/FS11-3154.pdf, p. 1. 
13 “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan–Tajik Basin 
Provinces, Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 2011.” United States Geological 
Survey. 2 February 2012.  http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3154/report/FS11-3154.pdf, p. 1. 
14 “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan–Tajik Basin 
Provinces, Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 2011.” United States Geological 
Survey. 2 February 2012.  http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3154/report/FS11-3154.pdf, p. 2. 
15 “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan–Tajik Basin 
Provinces, Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 2011.” United States Geological 
Survey. 2 February 2012.  http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2011/3154/report/FS11-3154.pdf, p. 3. 
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The South Caspian Basin 
According to a report from the Baker Institute at Rice University, the South 
Caspian Basin has the most “proven oil and gas resou ces” in Central Asia when 
including Azerbaijan and Iran. The basin stretches 400 km from the Republic of Georgia 
through Azerbaijan to southern Caspian Sea into inland Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
Iran. The same report also states the basin has a low geothermal gradient in which the 
temperature inside the basin only rises 1.5 degrees Cel ius for every 100 m of depth.16 
This means that much more oil and gas can be recovered at deeper depths, as deep as 10 
km, than in other basins.17 As technology improves when petroleum from new sources is 
needed, this basin is projected to produce more oil and gas in previously unexplored areas 
of the basin. 
Middle Caspian Basin and South Mangyshlak Subbasin 
The Middle Caspian spans from Azerbaijan and Russia in the west and 
Kazakhstan to the east. According to Ulmishek, it sits between the Great Caucasus 
foldbelt, which stretches along present-day Georgia and southern parts of the Republic of 
Dagestan, Russia, through the center of the Caspian Sea and ends at the South 
Mangyshlak subbasin in southwestern Kazakhstan.18 Ulmishek further explains that this 
basin has four total petroleum systems of which the South Mangyshlak total petroleum 
                                                 
16 Talwani, Manik, Andrei Belopolsky and Dianne L. Berry. “Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Geology and Petroleum Potential of Central Asia.” James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. April 1998. 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/geology-and-petroleum-potential-of-the-caspian-sea-region, p. 
3.  
17 Talwani, Manik, Andrei Belopolsky and Dianne L. Berry. Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Geology and Petroleum Potential of Central Asia. James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy of Rice University. April 1998. 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/geology-and-petroleum-potential-of-the-caspian-sea-region, p. 
3. 
18 Ulmishek, Gregory. "Petroleum Geology and Resources of the Middle Caspian Basin, Former Soviet 
Union." USGS, Mar. 2001, http://geology.cr.usgs.gov/pub/bulletins/b2201–a, p. 1. 
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system is in onshore and offshore Kazakhstan with over “40 discovered fields.”19 Despite 
having many fields discovered in the last few years, much is still unknown about the full 
energy potential of this basin. If further explorations uncover similar findings in nearby 
basins, then this basin should further increase the en rgy reserves and production 
potential of this region. 
OIL AND GAS STATISTICS  
The following information and data have been compiled by the consulting firm 
Business Monitor International (BMI). 
Turkmenistan Oil & Gas Reserve Supply and Characteristics 
Turkmenistan is a relatively new country in global oil and gas markets as it was 
closed off by the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the USSR, the country has been shown to 
have one of the largest supplies of gas reserves in the world. Today, BMI states this 
relatively small country has over 8 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) of commercially 
recoverable, proven reserves natural gas.20 The main recent discovery in Turkmenistan’s 
Amu Darya basin, which has augmented its reserve estimates, has been the finding of the 
South Yolotan gas field. This gas field was verified of its largesse and title as the 
“second-largest gas field” by British energy auditor Gaffney, Cline & Associates 
(GCA).21  Via GCA, BMI states that South Yolotan is believed to have between 13.1 and 
21.2 Tcm of natural gas, and the government, along with its state energy companies, has 
increased their overall estimates of gas production and gas exports in line with this new 
                                                 
19 Ulmishek, Gregory. "Petroleum Geology and Resources of the Middle Caspian Basin, Former Soviet 
Union." USGS, Mar. 2001, http://geology.cr.usgs.gov/pub/bulletins/b2201–a, p. 1. 
20 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 21. 
21 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 5. 
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discovery.22 If Turkmenistan’s projections of producing 230 billion cubic meters (bcm) 
and exporting 180 bcm of natural gas come true, then  country would become one of 
the most significant gas exporters in the world.23 
According to BMI, Turkmenistan’s other gas fields have been extracting gas for 
over twenty years and have appeared to decline in output, including the Amu-Darya 
Basin, Murgab Basin and the South Caspian Basin.24 While onshore fields have had great 
activity, Turkmenistan’s offshore plays, along with South Yolotan, hold potential as 
Turkmenistan’s new resources if future trends are fvorable to development. 25 
Uzbekistan Oil & Gas Reserve Supply and Characteristics 
Uzbekistan has less oil and gas reserves than either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, 
but the country has significant supplies that are us d for domestic consumption and 
export to sensitive portions of Central and South Asia, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Afghanistan. BMI states that Uzbekistan currently has around 171 proven oil and gas 
fields with the Kokdumalak project in the eastern Bukhara-Khiva region, consisting of 
around 70 percent of national oil production.26 Its gas reserves are within the 
“Qashgadaryo province” near Bukhara in the south-central areas of the country and in 
nearby Surkhandariya province close to the border with Afghanistan where Uzbekistan’s 
largest gas field, the “Boyangora-Gadzhak” field, was found.27 
                                                 
22 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 5. 
23 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 5. 
24 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 17. 
25 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 17. 
26 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 16. 
27 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 16. 
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BMI reports that in 2011 Uzbekistan generated around 65,000 barrels of crude oil 
and gas liquids per day (b/d); however, the country lost its status as a net exporter of oil 
after 2003.28 The country, therefore, imports nearly 100,000 b/dof crude to meet 
consumption of 160,000 b/d.29 Gas production continues to be above annual consumption 
at 48 bcm, and the country still produces 65 bcm and exporting a significant portion of it 
to Russia and to the region.30 
BMI states that Uzbekistan currently has around 1.9 Tcm of natural gas reserves 
with modest chances of further increases in production from 65 bcm to a forecasted 86 
bcm by 2016, meaning that, with production and exports continuing, Uzbekistan’s gas 
reserves will likely decline.31 Uzbekistan’s oil reserves are more modest as the country 
has had no significant conventional crude-oil field finds for many years. The country has 
just under 600 million barrels of recoverable oil, which will decline by about 11-12 
million barrels per year in accordance to its levels of production, according to BMI 
projections.32 
Kazakhstan Oil & Gas Reserve Supply and Characteristics 
Kazakhstan has the largest oil reserves of all the former-Soviet Central Asian 
states, mainly due to the size of the country, which give it more opportunities to find 
energy reserves within its own borders. With current proven oil reserves at 30 billion 
barrels, recent discoveries of huge fields like Kashagan, BMI projects that reserves will 
                                                 
28 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 16. 
29 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 16. 
30 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 16. 
31 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 18-23. 
32 “Uzbekistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 19-20. 
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grow by at least 10 billion barrels in the next decade.33 The country’s gas reserves, 
however, are more modest and mostly consist of unconventional forms of associated gas. 
From BMI figures, the country has reserves 2.5 Tcm of all forms of gas with the potential 
of 3.3 Tcm in the next ten years contingent on future successful exploration.34 
Kazakhstan’s main oil fields are along the Caspian Sea in the North Caspian basin 
and include Tengiz, Karachaganak and Kashagan. BMI reports that Tengiz has estimates 
of recoverable crude oil reserves between 6 to 9 billion barrels of oil at an annual 
production rate of 630,000 b/d of oil and 13.4 bcm of gas in 2008.35 Kazakhstan and the 
main joint-venture TengizChevrOil (TCO) that is in charge of developing Tengiz has 
committed to increasing annual production by nearly  hundred thousand b/d.36  
Karachaganak field is in northern Kazakhstan near its border with Russia near the 
Russian city of Orenburg. Based on figures from energy firm BG Group, Karachaganak 
has over 2.4 billion barrels of oil and over 450 bcm of natural gas at a production rate of 
106,000 b/d in 2002 and 224,000 b/d in 2009.37 If supply and production figures remain 
stable, the field should remain productive for at least 40 more years.38 
The largest find for Kazakhstan has been the Kashagan oil and gas field in 
offshore North Caspian Basin. This field is under dvelopment and is planned to be 
                                                 
33 “Kazakhstan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 20-22. 
34 “Kazakhstan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 21-23. 
35 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 44. 
36 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 44. 
37 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 44. 
38 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 44-45. 
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online by late 2012, which is a date later than the original online date of 2005.39  BMI 
states that the amount of technically recoverable reserves in Tengiz are currently 
projected at between 7 to 9 billion bbl and increase to between 9 to 13 billion bbl with 
advanced technologies like gas injection.40 According to KazMunaiGaz (KMG), current 
production estimates expect that by late 2012, the field should produce 75,000 b/d with a 
potential increase to 450,000 b/d by 2015 and to 1.5 million b/d by 2021.41 
CENTRAL -ASIAN OIL &  GAS PIPELINES  
The following section is a summary of the developed, developing and planned 
major oil and gas pipelines throughout the Central Asian region of the former Soviet 
Union. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list or to forecast future pipeline systems, 
but the pipelines or plans thereof are intended to highlight the complexity and strategy of 
the current pipeline system and of potential future pipelines. 
East-West Interconnector Pipeline (Under Construction) 
 According to BMI, this pipeline started development in May 2010 and is designed 
to transport gas from the newly discovered South Yolotan field to the Caspian port city of 
Turkmenbashi.42 The estimated cost will likely be $2 billion, whic will be undertaken 
solely by Turkmen firms with a target startup date for 2015. Once completed, the pipeline 
                                                 
39 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 43. 
40 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 43. 
41 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 43. 
42 “Turkmenistan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 28. 
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is anticipated to deliver 30 bcm per year and will fo ow a similar route to that of a 
current pipeline from Dauletabad field to Turkmenbashi.43 
Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline 
This pipeline was christened in December 2009 when t  presidents of China, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined together in a ceremony to 
commemorate its start into service.44 With a length of around 7,000 km, the pipeline 
transports gas from the Yolotan and Sag Kenar gas fields in northeastern Turkmenistan 
near the Uzbek border through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and ending in China currently 
with a terminus in the northwestern Xinjiang region.45 
This pipeline is the first to connect directly from Turkmenistan to China, and this 
pipeline system is independent of Russian supply or Russian pipeline control.46 BMI 
states that, in the first moments of operation, this pipeline was planned to ship nearly 13 
bcm of gas, but only 2.38 bcm of gas reached China from January through August 2010 
through this pipeline from Turkmen sources, according to Chinese statistics. In 2011, 
however, BMI shows that gas imports from Turkmenistan were over 5.7 bcm, a quick 
increase beyond Chinese expectations.47 Furthermore, Turkmen president Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedow signed an agreement with China on Nvember 2011 that would 
dramatically expand gas exports to China from 25 bcm per year to 65 bcm per year.48 
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BMI suggests that, if executed identically to the agreement, a significant portion of 
Turkmen gas supplies could be exported to China and could add Turkmen leverage 
against Russia in the near future.49 
Central Asia-Center Pipeline (CAC) 
This pipeline was the most important gas pipeline from Central Asia to Russia 
throughout the Soviet Union and was the only means for the Central-Asian satellites to 
export their gas supplies to the world. Recently, this pipeline had exports halted after a 
mysterious explosion damaged the pipeline in April 2009.50 Since January 2010, gas now 
runs from Turkmenistan to Russia through CAC at a contracted amount of 30 bcm per 
year from 2010 to 2028.51 The pipeline flows from Uzbekistan’s Shatlyk field to Khiva.52 
From there, it travels through Kazakhstan to Russia.53 BMI reports that it has recently 
only reached around 35-40 bcm of gas deliveries per yea , but the pipeline is currently 
under renovations that began in 2008, which should raise potential maximum capacity 
back to around 60 bcm.54 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) (Proposed) 
A pipeline that has been proposed multiple times since the 1990s, Turkmenistan 
and neighboring countries have, once again, showed official commitment to build this 
                                                 
49 “Turkmenistan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 29. 
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52 “Uzbekistan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 29. 
53 “Uzbekistan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
February 2012, p. 29. 
54 “Kazakhstan —Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor International, 
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pipeline connecting Turkmenistan with South Asian states. BMI reports that, in 
November 2011, Turkmenistan signed a Gas Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) with 
Pakistan an initial amount of $7.6 billion for finally building the TAPI gas pipeline.55 The 
pipeline is expected to be online on December 2016, being reliant on the security 
situation in Afghanistan improving. If plans proceed uninterrupted, Afghanistan will get 
5.2 bcm of gas year while the pipeline will have a m ximum supply of 33 bcm per year.56 
The pipeline would transmit gas from Dauletabad field through Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India.57 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Oil Pipeline 
The CPC is a 1,500 km pipeline that became a vital p peline system linking north-
Caspian fields in Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk, Russia on the Black Sea.58 Initially, the 
network included tankers delivering Kazakh crude through the Caspian to pipeline 
networks ending in Novorossiysk. Today, the CPC operates completely on one pipeline 
that carries around 560,000 b/d, and all the consortium’s members, ranging from 
American IOCs to Russian and Kazakh NOCs and manufacturing firms, agreed to expand 
pipeline volume to 1.4 or 1.5 million b/d.59 
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline and Kazakh Caspian Transport System 
(KCTS) 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on June 16, 2008 to ship Kazakh 
oil to Azerbaijan for the BTC pipeline.60 This pipeline is known as one of the most 
strategic oil pipelines in the world as it was fully online in in the mid-2000s and bypasses 
Russia by supplying Caspian crude oil to markets in Europe. In November 2008, 
Kazakhstan began sending crude oil from Tengiz field to the BTC pipeline, using tankers 
from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijani ports.61 BMI states that when the new Kashagan oil field 
is online by mid-decade, Kazakhstan would like to ship many thousands of barrels a day 
to contribute to the potential overall capacity of BTC by 760,000 b/d.62 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGION  
The geology, reserve amounts, existing pipeline infrastructure and plans for new 
projects show that Central Asia has much potential into becoming one of the world’s 
most important sources of energy for this century. This region is unique from other parts 
of the world because it must find ways to export energy that require the help of other 
countries. For Central Asia, they need help; but their battle is to engage with the world 
without surrendering what they gained when the Soviet Union fell. 
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Chapter 2: History of Central Asia’s Post-Soviet Energy Sector 
INTRODUCTION  
Central Asia contains the energy resources and the pipeline infrastructure to use 
as a foundation to become a major energy-producing region in the 21st century. This 
future potential, however, is not enough to guarantee this region’s success going forward. 
The history concerning the development of its energy policy since the fall of the Soviet 
Union has greatly impacted the growth of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
forcing each of them to remain in Russia’s influenc in energy matters. Uzbekistan has a 
unique challenge facing energy producers regionally by having to struggle against 
Islamist and other radical groups that aim to depos the Uzbek government, which would 
send the region into crisis. These states have beenabl  to strive through the last twenty 
years with their regimes intact, though far from reaching their dreams of full energy 
autonomy. With the recent addition of China entering into the Central Asian markets, all 
countries could reduce their dependence on Russia for survival; but their Soviet legacy 
and its diplomatic maneuvers show that Russia will remain a substantial influence over 
the region. 
Based greatly on the research and analysis of Daniel Yergin, Wojciech Ostrowski, 
Adam N. Stulberg, Luca Anceschi and Minton F. Goldman, this chapter summarizes 
some of the historical developments of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The 
first section concerns Kazakhstan’s political energy history as its president struggles to 
strengthen his power over the energy sector from elite rivals from the western regions of 
the country that holds the valuable energy resources. The next section concerns the 
history of Turkmenistan as its first president promotes a policy of “positive neutrality” 
that is designed to enable its leader to bolster his authoritarian hold on his country. The 
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country’s energy sector suffers from Russian aggression towards it and from poor 
domestic management. The final section discusses the history in post-Soviet Uzbekistan 
that had to strive to preserve its rule from religious and separatist movements that 
threatened the state. Although Uzbekistan’s main historical problems did not involve its 
energy sector, the instability in and near the country threatened to destabilize all energy 
relationships in the region. Though a limited number of works here combine the history 
of the oil industry, security and their relation to the region’s political economy, this 
synopsis is made to stimulate further research on these factors. 
KAZAKHSTAN : CONSOLIDATING NAZARBAEV ’S CONTROL  
As Daniel Yergin chronicles in The Quest, upon the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
leader of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, Narsultan Nazarbaev, a long-time 
apparatchik to the Soviet cause, told his colleagues in Moscow that, regardless of how 
much time and investment the Soviet Union made, the Caspian is now a Kazakh 
hydrocarbon hub. Even though a former Russian energy minister brazenly declared to the 
world that “Eto nasha neft’,” or “This is our oil,” the Kazakh people now have control of 
their own energy.1  
Yergin continues to explain that the most prominent example of Kazakhs’ anxiety 
of continued Russian energy relations was the blowout of oil well number 37 at Tengiz 
oil field in 1985. The blowout still is known to be one of the worst oil spills as Soviet 
reports told of a flame column of 700 feet above the Caspian Sea that took over a year to 
put under control.2 Soviet technology and knowhow was insufficient to put out the fires, 
                                                 
1 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
Penguin, 2011, p. 47. 
2 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
Penguin, 2011, p. 64 
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so the Soviets had to call on American IOCs to put out the massive fires and to stop the 
massive loss of oil.3  
Before the last day of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to entice 
Western firms to use its superior skills to renovate its inferior energy infrastructure. 
According to Yergin, Chevron was one of the companies that accepted Gorbachev’s 
invitation, as the Soviet Union, still in control of Tengiz oil field, only gave Chevron 
access for rights to develop the field.4 Once the fall of the Soviet Union was complete 
and Nazarbaev assumed control of negotiating the terms of developing Tengiz from 
Moscow, the new consortium, TengizChevrOil, became a joint company consisting of the 
Kazakh energy establishment and the government and American company Chevron.5 
According to Ostrowski, the ultimate arrangement was an evenly split joint venture with 
80.4% of revenue allocated to Kazakhstan and 19.6% to Chevron through a 40-year 
period.6 Initially, Chevron and the Kazakhs developed a system by which tankers would 
deliver about 100,000 barrels a day from Atyrau on the northeast coast of the country to 
Baku, Azerbaijan where crude would be transferred to rail tankers to Odessa, Ukraine.7 
Kazakh authorities understood that this primitive transport network was not sustainable 
and a new pipeline would need to be built; but its route would have to include Russia.  
Yergin also states that in 1996, Kazakhstan and Russia worked together to create 
a new consortium, which would be known as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) 
                                                 
3 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
Penguin, 2011, p. 64 
4 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
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5 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
Penguin, 2011, p. 66. 
6 Ostrowski, Wojciech. Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 35. 
7 Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World. New York: 
Penguin, 2011, p. 69-70. 
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that would build a pipeline from Tengiz around the Caspian coast into Russia and ending 
at the Russian Black Sea coast where it would be sent on tanker to global markets.8 
Kazakhstan and Russia managed to bring together Kazakh, Russian and American firms, 
as well as temporary investment from Oman, to make up the conglomerate.9 Yergin 
explains that even with their disagreements, Kazakhstan and Russia managed to have the 
pipeline built completely with first supplies being shipped from Tengiz in 2001.10 Yergin 
also states this was the first time Kazakhstan was “integrated into the global oil industry” 
since this oil was being produced specifically for n n-Russian/non-Soviet consumption.11 
Since then, in a country with a massive amount of recoverable oil and gas 
supplies, its government has been witness to many delays in developing fields like 
Kashagan over many years. Some of the delays have been at the fault of the government 
or of the national oil companies, like KazMunaiGaz. Though these two entities are 
structurally separated and, sometimes, act differently from each other, each are usually 
considered as working for the same side, for the Kazakh elite. Kazakh energy institutions 
evolved to their present state thanks greatly to the Nazarbaev family and this clique that 
have been the most powerful faction in Kazakh development in defining the country’s 
future success or failure in developing its energy sector and, within this, its relationship 
with its foreign energy partners.12 
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Ostrowski states that, in 1992, the former Soviet organization, Kazakhstan Oil and 
Gas Corporation was transformed into Kazakhstanmunaigaz, and the government added 
its own Ministries for “Energy and Fuel Resources” and for “Geology.”13 After creating 
these ministries and the bureaucratic structure to support them, Nazarbaev severed all 
contracts between the Soviet Union and foreign oil c mpanies, even those with Chevron 
in Tengiz. In its place, Kazakhstan made its own cotracts, which gave rise to 
TengizChevrOil.14  
Secondly, Nazarbaev had to struggle to maintain his influence throughout the 
country’s energy affairs from political and elite rivals in the oil-rich western parts. Power 
and influence in Kazakh history has been determined mostly by the struggle among 
nomadic tribes in the territory. Nazarbaev and his faction belong to a nomadic tribe in 
Eastern and Southern Kazakhstan, while different tribes have controlled the Western 
portions where Kazakh energy reserves are located.15 During the Soviet Union, these 
internecine conflicts declined, but with Kazakh independence, these rivalries have 
returned, though not to the extent as in Kazakh history. 
Local governments away from Astana and Almaty have therefore been privy to 
acting independently from Nazarbaev. In fact, leaders will operate in defiance of 
Nazarbaev if the local region finds that their decisions are more in their local interests at 
the expense of the national interest.16 In response to what would be disobedience to the 
president, Nazarbaev took measures to preserve his control in the early 1990s in many 
undemocratic ways. According to Ostrowski, he dissolved parliament and invented a new 
constitution, which was adopted on August 30, 1995, affording him new executive 
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15 Hanks, Reuel R. Global Security Watch--Central Asia. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010, p. 61. 
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powers while reducing legislative powers from elected officials who come from regions 
that are less loyal to Nazarbaev’s political continge cy.17 
One main economic motivation for Nazarbaev’s maneuvers was that his rivals 
wanted to accelerate privatization of the Kazakh energy sector, including the Kazakh 
energy bureaucracy. From this concern, his changes to the political structure of the 
national government were not enough. Therefore, Nazarbaev signed Decree #3378, 
“Additional Measures to Reform the Organization of State Entities in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,” which eliminated numerous governmental departments including the 
ministries of Geology and Oil & Gas.18 Replacing them was the establishment of a new 
National Oil Company (NOC), named the KazakhOil National Oil and Gas Company.19 
Not only had creating an NOC further solidified Nazarbaev’s control over the most 
important economic sector in the economy; it also undermined his rivals’ aspirations to 
have a private energy sector in local control. 
Later on February 20, 2002, Nazarbaev created a new NOC known as 
KazMunaiGaz (KMG) from a merger of KazakhOil and the “National Company 
Transportation of Oil and Gas” (CJSC).20 Nazarbaev made this change in order to reform 
relations between the national government and foreign and domestic energy firms where 
the previous configuration failed to benefit Nazarbaev’s interests. Furthermore, 
Nazarbaev gave into the demands of the “local bourgeoisie” in energy projects in western 
Kazakhstan and confirmed that his rivals in other regions will not be subordinate to 
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foreign energy companies: “[F]oreigners should forget about being a ‘big brother’ and 
should settle for being junior partners.”21 
Russia and Kazakhstan: Working with its Former Master 
For much of the post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia 
had exploited Kazakhstan’s limited choices in exporting its energy supply through 
creating trade contracts heavily in favor of Russia. While oil trade is largely immune 
from severe arbitrage between a supply country and a transit state, natural-gas markets 
remain susceptible to such trade imbalances. For example, in 2006 Russia obtained gas 
from states like Kazakhstan for around $100 per 1,000 cubic meters; but Russia sold the 
same amount to Europe at a substantial markup of $265 or $285.22 All the windfalls from 
purchase to sale go directly to Russia without any benefit to Kazakhstan. With few 
alternatives to Russian supply chains, Kazakhstan has been forced to sell its gas at a 
lower price while customers in Europe have been able to sell its gas at a higher price. 
For Gazprom and Russia, Kazakhstan remains a large source of revenue in a 
country that needed more “petrodollars” in order to develop Russia’s economy, to 
increase Putin’s popularity at home, to bolster Russian influence abroad and to reduce 
Kazakh autonomy in its domestic energy affairs. Their dominance, however, was not 
inevitable and required masterful diplomacy from the Kremlin and from its energy 
companies since Nazarbaev, though raised a Soviet appar tchik, was developing energy 
policy in his best interests, including unmooring the country from Russia if it were in 
Kazakhstan’s best interests. 
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In the 1990s, while the Kazakh energy leadership was feeling confident about 
their potential energy independence from Russia, the Russians developed a strategy to 
convince, not to force, Kazakhstan to remain loyal to Russian energy interests.23 Russia 
was aiming for the “status quo,” and, in persuading its former Soviet satellite that staying 
with Russia was the best option, explained to Nazarbaev that the “status quo” with Russia 
was the only viable option for them.24 First, Stulberg explains how Russia developed its 
existing market power in energy markets, upstream and downstream, and its regulatory 
power to reduce the incentives, financially and politically, for Kazakhstan to shrink its 
energy relationship with Russia or to expand other relationships beyond Russia.25 
Russia provided incentives to Kazakhstan to reduce the transit fees that 
Kazakhstan would pay to Russia for transmitting natural gas northward and to increase 
the amount of oil and gas Russia would purchase from Kazakhstan. These actions would 
reduce the insecurity Kazakhs were facing during the collapse of the Soviet energy 
market system, and Russia’s policies would reduce the need for Nazarbaev to accelerate 
energy deals with China or the West.26 Russia also developed gas relationships with 
Kazakhstan’s potential new customers, like China and Turkey, in order to preclude 
Kazakh energy markets from entering into these foreign markets. Russia would sell gas at 
a much cheaper price, akin to the practice of “dumping,” and to promote pipeline projects 
from Russia to foreign markets that would erase the need for other gas sources for long 
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periods.27 Since Kazakhstan had a much reduced ability to recruit apital and to develop 
energy projects with other states compared to Russia, Kazakhstan eventually saw that its 
options for developing robust relationships with new markets would quickly vanish as 
soon as Russia made sweeter deals to regional energy consumers.28 
With Russia disrupting Kazakh ambitions, Kazakhstan h d no other country that 
could help to counterbalance Russia’s tough energy diplomacy. Although the U.S. and 
the West were reaching out to Kazakhstan and Western IOC’s were active in the country, 
Western governments were busy on creating the “deal of the century” with Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey in securing the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipeline and the subsequent Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (BTE).29 China was too 
small an economy and had too young an energy sector to assist Kazakhstan with its 
energy exports, though it would quickly expand not long thereafter. Central-Asian 
neighbors Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were too volatile nd too unstable to help 
Kazakhstan spread to southern markets in Iran and South Asia. With these options 
untenable and Russia’s energy machinations, Kazakhst n ultimately was “convinced” 
that sticking with Russia was in Kazakhstan’s best interests.30 
 As a consolation for Kazakhstan, solidifying relations with Russia had the effect 
to alleviate any tension with Russia created after th  collapse of the Soviet Union and 
assured Kazakhstan that it will have a stable market for its supplies without having to 
invest in massive infrastructure to generate trade. As of the late 2000s, over 90% of its 
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gas exports went through Russian pipelines like the Central-Asia Center pipeline.31 From 
the 1990s, China has entered the Kazakh markets with collaboration with oil and gas 
projects and, most notably, with the construction of pipelines, like the Kazakhstan-China 
Pipeline from Western Kazakh fields to China’s Xinjia g region, commissioned in the 
mid to late 2000s.32 Nevertheless, Chinese assistance and demand for Kazakh energy 
products have not allowed Nazarbaev or energy firms n Kazakhstan to reduce significant 
reliance on Russia or to renegotiate energy contracts in Kazakhstan’s favor. Russia’s 
tough energy diplomacy was largely effective in keeping Kazakhstan in Russia’s sphere 
of influence in the first twenty years of Kazakh independence. 
TURKMENISTAN : UNCONVENTIONAL LEADERSHIP AND “POSITIVE NEUTRALITY ” 
After achieving independence, Turkmenistan and its au ocratic leader Saparmurat 
Niyazov declared his country’s foreign policy will pursue a doctrine called “positive 
neutrality.”33 According to Anceschi, this approach was intended to observe a policy of 
“non-interference” in others’ national affairs of other states and not passing judgment on 
the legitimacy or integrity of other states. At thesame time, Turkmenistan stated that it 
would “openly and fairly cooperate with all the countries which try to achieve noble 
objectives” without specifically specifying what “objectives” Turkmenistan wishes to 
achieve.34 In the 1990s Niyazov and other Turkmen authorities had difficulty determining 
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what its foreign-policy goals were since its political economy had little to offer to the 
world beside energy. 
Niyazov, the former head of the Turkmen Soviet Republic, was the leader of 
Turkmenistan until his death in 2006. During his time as leader, he led a government in 
which he was the undisputed leader, creating a cult of personality that included gold 
statues erected in his name and months of the year named after his family. He also 
required schoolchildren read the book Ruhnama, or The Book of the Soul, which was 
noted as a type of “spiritual guide” that perpetuated Niyazov’s cult of personality and 
replaced education in traditional subjects like math and sciences.35 Niyazov also was 
infamous for human-rights abuses, including repression against freedom of speech and 
political opposition. With this record, Niyazov’s foreign policy of “positive neutrality” 
was a policy to protect the country from condemnation from its neighbors since they 
would most likely work with Turkmenistan, despite is reputation, as long as Niyazov is 
quiet on other states’ domestic affairs.  
This included refusing to join most international organizations, especially Central-
Asian regional organizations. In lieu of joining regional organizations, Turkmenistan 
adamantly publicized its policy of neutrality and its adherence to universally accepted 
treaties like the UN Charter.36 The country went so far as to submit a resolution into the 
UN General Assembly, which passed on accession, which declared that Turkmenistan 
was a neutral state. Despite the seemingly conciliatory approach to the world, Turkmen 
neutrality had a domestic-policy objective. 
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As Anceschi explains, “positive neutrality” was a form of absolution of judgment 
against others was intended to protect Niyazov as he consolidated the energy sector in his 
own interests, taking advantage to Russia’s apathy to Niyzov’s human-rights record and 
the West’s indifference toward this small country’s affairs.37 In this case, Niyazov’s use 
of foreign-policy neutrality worked sufficiently well in diverting the world’s attention 
from Turkmen political and economic repression for many years. 
Beyond domestic affairs, Turkmen firm neutrality did not noticeably help its 
interests. One analyst on Turkmen affairs, Gregory Gleason, states that Turkmen 
“positive neutrality” had some energy-policy objectives, such as finding new pipeline 
routes for gas exports and to recruit foreign investm nt.38 Western governments and 
energy firms, however, were busy with other concerns. For example, Western 
governments were more preoccupied to other regions in the world, like the Balkans and 
Russia, than with Turkmen policy.39 Energy firms were busy with projects in the rest of 
the former Soviet Union such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In fact, the 1990s 
saw a steep decline in energy prices, which reduced further the interest in energy firms 
wanting to enter frontier markets, such as Turkmenista . Knowing that the world was 
unlikely to work with Niyazov, Russia took advantage of this combination of neutrality 
and apathy to exploit Turkmenistan’s vulnerable energy position, like Kazakhstan’s, to 
preserve its influence over this state. 
Like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan was motivated with its newfound independence 
and export potential, but Russian energy diplomacy was working to preserve Russian 
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influence there with much more aggressive actions tward Niyazov than to Nazarbaev. 
According to Stulberg, starting only a few years after independence, Turkmenistan 
started seeing its energy revenues begin to plummet, resulting from declining demand to 
European markets controlled by Russia to which the vast majority of Turkmen gas went 
through Russian pipelines to these markets.40 Stulberg goes further to say that from 1993 
to 1998 the country had many years of anemic economic growth and development with 
disappointing employment, GDP and civil-society figures that defined the perilous state 
of the Turkmen regime; and, at the same time, the Turkmen gas industry experienced 
severe drops in gas production and income from exports, which included outright Russian 
embargoes on Turkmen imports for many years.41 
Like with Kazakhstan, Russia manipulated energy markets in key Turkmen 
potential energy clients. Stulberg explains that, in Western Europe, Russia expanded 
supply to these customers from its own reserves and by procuring new natural-gas 
contracts with Western customers, thereby preventing Turkmenistan from developing 
projects or signing energy agreements without Russian involvement. As a result, Russia 
agreed to supply 60% of EU natural-gas demand growth through the early 2000s.42 
Outside Europe, “Russia also exploited its global mrket power” in other energy markets 
by working with Turkey and Iran on new projects befor  Turkmenistan could make an 
impression.43 One such project was the “Blue-Stream pipeline” from Russian reserves 
that traveled through the Black Sea to Turkey, which had its first agreement secured in 
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1997.44 In Iran, Russia was able to use its diplomatic relationship to persuade Iran not to 
develop any broad projects with its northeastern neighbor in order to preserve Iran’s 
relationship with Russia, which was integral to its o her ambitions, like nuclear 
technology and resisting Western pressure against the Islamic regime.45 
With reduced revenues from existing energy exports and the lack of opportunities 
outside Russia to find new markets, Niyazov was increasingly enraged over the loss of 
outlets to sell gas outside Russia, especially to its Iranian neighbor. Having nowhere else 
to turn their resources or their diplomacy, Niyazov begrudgingly tried to make a deal 
with Russia.46 Even with aggressive Turkmen negotiating tactics, Niyazov compromised 
on a 25-year contract that sold two Tcm to Russia at deeply discounted prices from 2003, 
benefiting Russia and damaging Turkmen interests.47 
From recent years, much of Turkmenistan’s exports go through Russian pipelines 
at discounted rates paid to Turkmenistan from Russia.48 Recently, however, China has 
been active in Turkmenistan, located furthest from the closest Chinese energy markets in 
the Xinjiang region. Turkmenistan’s relationship with China accelerated with the 
agreement to construct a gas pipeline with Kazakhstn, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 
2006 in what would become the Central Asia-China pipeline, which initiated service in 
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2010.49 This new pipeline will add much needed revenues for Ashgabat, and this project 
is a step in reducing Turkmen dependency on Russian energy revenues for regime 
survival. 
UZBEKISTAN : REDUCING VOLATILITY HERE TO PROTECT ENERGY IN THE REGION  
 Uzbekistan and its president Islam Karimov does not have the same energy 
potential as either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan have, but this country is the transit point 
of many important regional pipelines like the Central Asia-Center pipeline and the 
Central Asia-China pipeline. With its substantially larger population at over 28 million 
people at a median age of 26, the country is vulnerabl  to internal instability by ethnic 
tension or sectarian violence endangering energy operations not only in Uzbekistan but 
also throughout the region.50 Karimov’s challenges, therefore, are less related o 
developing its energy sector but to ensuring that his country does not become the source 
of worsening regional energy relations between the region and the world. 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise ofindependent Uzbekistan, 
Karimov immediately fought to protect his country and Uzbek nationals living in 
neighboring states like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which had been in civil war from 1992 
to 1997, where ethnic or sectarian tension threatend to endanger the security of ethnic 
Uzbeks in Uzbekistan and beyond it. For example, as Goldman explains, nationalists 
tried to force Uzbeks to read and speak a language oth r than Uzbek in states like 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.51 Karimov also accused Turkmenistan of persecuting ethnic 
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Uzbeks under pretexts that they were fomenting unrest. In fact, Turkmen president 
Sepamurad Niyazov was conveniently accusing Uzbekistan for an assassination attempt 
on him in 2002.52 These and other accusations toward Uzbekistan led its repressive 
president to use this foreign tension as a pretext to shut down alleged “anti-Uzbek” 
activity in the region, even by using military pressure.53 With these societal and 
diplomatic pressures on Karimov, Uzbek relations with most of its Central-Asian 
neighbors deteriorated greatly in the first decade of post-Soviet independence. 
 According to Goldman, Karimov had broader ambitions for his country that 
would make Uzbekistan a prominent force in the region. In order to realize these goals, 
he had to suppress those movements and powers that would threaten Karimov’s regime, 
Uzbek diaspora or similar interests in the region. Karimov gave financial support to the 
Tajik regime to help it resist Islamist efforts to t pple the government, which would 
undermine Uzbek interests region-wide.54 Karimov also took advantage or its newfound 
independence to reduce the influence of Russia in the region by insisting that Russia cede 
its control over military activities in the region to the separate Central-Asian states or to 
regional organizations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
 One other organization that Karimov wanted to use to limit Russian influence in 
the region was the Central Asian Union (CAU). Karimov conceived this group of 
Central-Asian states, consisting of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as 
Uzbekistan’s attempt to unite Central-Asian policy at the expense Russian influence. 
Specifically, Karimov wanted the organization to reflect the ideals of the “Turkic 
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peoples” that have inhabited Central Asia for centuries; however, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan were wary of becoming a part of this anti-Russian organization because 
joining would antagonize Russia, causing Russia to halt trade or military assistance that 
would directly impact stability.55 In part from this fear of provoking Russian retaliation, 
the CAU has yet to become an influential regional organization or a group that can 
compete with Russian power.56 Uzbekistan also joined the GUUAM group consisting of 
other former Soviet states of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, each hoping 
that this group would compete against Russia- and Kazakhstan-led CIS, but this group 
also has failed to be a worthy challenger to Russian efforts at regional diplomacy as 
Uzbekistan withdrew from this group in 2005.57 
 Despite clear signs of Uzbek competition against Russian influence, Karimov 
maintained good relations with the Russian Federation, mostly on military, security and 
political matters. Karimov was a supporter of Yeltsin and came to his defense, especially 
during the Russian political crisis of the early 1993 in which Yeltsin was under threat of a 
constitutional crisis from Communists and nationalists but prevailed. Karimov wanted to 
maintain this relationship with Yeltsin in order to c ntinue the arms trade and military 
cooperation with the Russian Federation as well as the support Russia gave to Uzbek 
struggles against terrorist and radical factions.58 Beyond these endeavors, Uzbek-Russian 
cooperation in the 1990s did not significantly strengthen economic or energy matters 
compared to the Soviet era. 
                                                 
55 Goldman, Minton F. Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, andthe War on Terror. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 19. 
56 Akhmadov, Erkin. “Uzbekistan: Central Asian Union Destined to Remain on Paper.” Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute, 30 Apr. 2008. http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4850/print. 
57 “Uzbekistan postavil tochku v svoih otnoshenijah s GUAM.” Lenta.ru, 29 Dec. 2005, 
http://lenta.ru/news/2005/12/29/guam/. 
58 Goldman, Minton F. Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, andthe War on Terror. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 122. 
 33 
 After the September 11 attacks in New York, the American invasion of 
Afghanistan was a boon for Uzbek military and security operations as well as for 
relations with the West mostly because the U.S. needed Uzbekistan for efficiently 
executing its “War on Terror” against the Taliban and terrorist groups. In exchange for 
hundreds of millions of dollars of trade and aid, Uzbekistan granted the U.S. access to its 
military bases, like Karshi-Khanabad (K2), virtually unconditionally as well as grant 
them airspace rights and permission to set up U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
operations in the country.59 In addition to trade and economic aid, Uzbekistan secured 
from the U.S. a “status of forces” agreement, American support against the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and American support fr the Karimov regime despite 
criticisms of its human-rights record from Western organizations like Amnesty 
International.60 Uzbekistan also exploited its relationship with America to resist further 
pressure from Putin’s Russia, which became more assrtive of its foreign ambitions than 
Yeltsin. Mindful of Russia’s influence, Karimov was careful not to be too close to the 
U.S. that could have incited Russian reprisal. 
 From Goldman’s analysis, as American operations in Afghanistan continued, 
Uzbek-American relations became more strained as Karimov continued to operate in 
ways that put pressure on the U.S. to make its Central-Asian partner to change its ways. 
Critics continued to assail Karimov for his crackdowns against religious and political 
freedom in the country. American observers also criticized Karimov for his ties with Iran 
mainly in order to preserve good relations with fellow Islamic nations. The U.S. feared 
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that pressure from states like Iran and other Islamic states could force Karimov to expel 
American forces in the name of Muslim solidarity.61 
 Uzbek—American relations deteriorated substantially fter the Andijon Uprising 
on May 13, 2005 in which Uzbek forces killed many unarmed demonstrators, ranging 
from an official count of 187 to activists’ count of around 1,500 deaths.62 Uzbekistan’s 
official rationale for action in this town in the volatile Fergana Valley was to repress 
activity from terrorist groups the IMU and the Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) against the 
government; but others on the incident believe that pro esters were incited to protest after 
the government began its prosecution to 23 businessm n for “religious extremism,” 
which protesters saw as illegitimate and another affront to their political and religious 
rights on top of high unemployment and low economic growth.63 Regardless of the actual 
events leading to and during the Andijon incident, the U.S. was quite critical of 
Karimov’s actions against its citizens. U.S. Senators and other political leaders were 
openly questioning the value of America’s partnership with autocratic regimes like 
Uzbekistan in wake of Andijon, and U.S. officials feared that not being critical against 
Karimov would hurt American interests in Afghanistan, Iraq and the rest of the “Muslim 
world.” 64 
Angered by the U.S. response to a domestic dispute, Karimov quickly threatened 
the U.S. that it would be forced to pay higher fees to use the K2 base and that it could be 
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expelled from using it altogether.65 According to Goldman, before the Andijon uprising, 
however, Karimov was concerned that the U.S. presence i  the country, which was 
approaching three years, was hurting his relations with Russia and China and damaging 
his control over domestic economic activity as American firms and contractors were 
becoming more entangled in Uzbek operations in the military sphere as well as in the 
broader economy. Eventually, on July 25, 2005, Karimov ordered U.S. forces out of K2 
and the rest of the country within six months of his order.66 
 After American forces left K2, Karimov continued his anti-democratic tendencies 
by continuing his repressive policies against dissent and unsanctioned religious activities. 
He was fearful that the American exit would stimulate American plans to oust the Uzbek 
leader through American collusion with Uzbek-based NGO’s. His fears were fueled from 
American support for the “Tulip Revolution” in nearby Kyrgyzstan and the other 
“Colored Revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia during this time. As a result, Karimov 
suspended NGO activity in the country. He further invigorated his grip on the country 
when in the December 2007 elections, despite a constitutional requirement that forbids 
Karimov from serving another term, Karimov ran in ad won this election, despite 
American and international objections.67 
 Russia and China, however, were indifferent of Karimov’s actions from 2005, and 
used the fractures in the American relationship to engage Uzbekistan in improving 
relations with both states. After the Andijon uprising and the U.S. criticism, Karimov 
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flew to China to meet with Chinese president Hu Jintao in late-May 2005.68 He then 
visited Putin in Russia for further support in wake of Western condemnation of the Uzbek 
regime. Since then, relations with Russia and China ave helped to supplement foreign 
support lost when the Americans withdrew from K2 and reduced other cooperation. 
 Russia, had been planning for a possible opportunity to improve relations with 
Karimov years before the Andijon uprising. For example, Putin achieved some headway 
against American influence in the country through the Samarkand Summit in August 
2003. In it Putin and Karimov signed agreements in security, trade and energy. 
Specifically, both agreed that Gazprom would work with Uzbek firms to develop energy 
projects in order to increase production and exporting potential. Another meeting in 2004 
further bolstered cooperation in these fields, with additional agreements with energy 
firms Gazprom, Lukoil and Soyuzneftgaz.69 
 From Goldman’s research, after the Andijon controve sy, Russia and Uzbekistan 
made military cooperation a priority. Both countries signed a treaty of alliance on 
November 14, 2005 that codified into international law the shared understanding that an 
attack on Uzbekistan was an attack on Russia and vice ersa.70 Both countries also 
participated in a joint-military exercise in south Uzbekistan in late September 2005, as 
American troops were preparing their exit from K2.71 Karimov further excited Russian 
interests in the region when he agreed to rejoin CSTO and become greater involved with 
SCO and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). This as isted Uzbek security 
                                                 
68 “Peregovory Predsedatelja KNR Hu Czin'tao i Prezidnta Uzbekistana Islama Karimova.” Posol'stva 
KNR v RF, 25 May 2005, http://ru.china-embassy.org/rus/sgxw/t197372.htm. 
69 Goldman, Minton F. Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, andthe War on Terror. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 140. 
70 Goldman, Minton F. Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, andthe War on Terror. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 142. 
71 Goldman, Minton F. Rivalry in Eurasia: Russia, the United States, andthe War on Terror. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 142. 
 37 
interests that were lost in the American diplomatic fallout. With its participation in SCO 
affairs, Uzbekistan had the support from the organiz tion’s “Rapid Deployment Force” 
that assisted governments on threats to regional security and stability.72 
 Cooperation with China on security and energy matters has also helped Karimov 
protect his interests domestically and with his Central-Asian counterparts by working 
with China to develop its energy infrastructure for delivering energy supplies through the 
region to foreign consumers and further bolstering its operations against security threats 
in its country from affecting the entire region. Specifically, China worked with Karimov 
to develop the Central Asia-China pipeline with therest of the region. China has also 
worked with Uzbekistan to develop existing and new energy fields in the country along 
with new routes from these fields to customers in China.73 Energy cooperation would not 
be possible without Chinese efforts to strengthen Uzbek security because China, or any 
other investor, would invest time and money to Uzbekistan in its energy sector without 
involvement in the country’s security. 
 This balance between energy cooperation and security assurances has shaped 
much of Uzbek foreign outreach in the last decade; however, Karimov has again become 
more insistent on maintaining political autonomy from foreign rivals. For example, in 
2012, Karimov withdrew his government from the CSTO in part because Russia led a 
resolution within the organization to forbid foreign overnments not in the CSTO to have 
military operations in any foreign state without approval of all CSTO states, giving 
Russia a de facto veto on American and Chinese military entry into Central Asia.74 
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Though Russia remains an energy and political partner, Karimov has, once again, reached 
out to the West on security matters, though not as intensely as before, but is open to 
rapprochement with the United States government. U.S. and Western firms have been 
well entrenched in the Uzbek energy sector despite problems in the broader Uzbek-U.S. 
relationship; and their cooperation in energy and other sectors is most likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future as Karimov shifts his foreign priorities to hedging against 
Russian and Chinese influence, regardless of the past challenges between the West and 
Karimov. 
HISTORY AS A GUIDE TO THE REGION ’S FUTURE 
The countries that make up Central Asia, especially ts largest energy producers, 
underwent many challenges in order to emerge from their Soviet pasts to become 
independent, sovereign states in the 21st century. The Soviet legacy has been heavy 
burden for all three countries to wean off dependence on Russian pipeline networks for 
exporting oil and gas and receiving much needed foreign revenues. Uzbekistan struggled 
with an additional problem of sectarianism and separatism from Islamist and ethnic 
factions that want to undermine the Karimov regime, which would send the entire region 
into turmoil. China’s relationships with the three main Central-Asian energy exporters 
has been a welcome development for the entire region, adding revenues to each regime 
and creating closer relationships between the region and an emerging economic giant in 
this century. 
After the first decade of the 21st century, Central Asia remains deeply dependent 
on Russia for its energy policy as a result of the Soviet pipeline legacy and Russian 
diplomatic maneuvers to preserve its influence over th  energy interests of the region. As 
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this region goes forward, the energy-producing state  face many challenges that inhibit 
them from becoming influential members of the globa energy market.
 40 
Chapter 3: Challenges to Central-Asian Energy Development 
 The main challenges to developing Central-Asian energy are often relics from the 
Soviet era and the first few years after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some of these 
problems include geography, including the vulnerability of pipelines; terrorism and other 
threats of instability; corruption and economic misanagement; inexperience in the 
global economy due to the region’s long history under Soviet rule; and difficulties 
adapting to the global economy. Central Asian governments cope with these challenges 
in less ideal ways that usually harken back to the ways of the Soviet Union.1 
 These challenges to energy development and the flaw d pproaches to solve them 
have stunted growth and prosperity for many years. This chapter will explain the 
particular challenges and how governments have addressed them if at all. The first 
section will concern security concerns, including pipeline geography, domestic political 
unrest and regional sectarian violence, which all endanger energy development. 
Economic and financial issues are next in which governments and National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) have shown to be corrupt, inefficint or incompetent in executing 
good energy policy and business practices. Finally, this chapter will explain how this 
region, which must interact with the international community to export its energy and to 
receive foreign revenue, has been vulnerable to being coopted from their regional 
partners, Russia and China, often through the use of multilateral organizations like the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). This chapter does not conclude that these challenges are 
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insuperable but that improper action towards them will lead to further problems for the 
Central-Asian energy sector. 
CHALLENGES OF SECURITY  
At the moment of independence, Central Asia’s energy leaders were already at a 
disadvantage. They are a landlocked region without a river or sea that has access to an 
ocean. Its energy infrastructure is dominated by pipelines because it is the only feasible 
way to ship major amounts of oil and gas to customers abroad, but they almost all went 
through Russia beginning in the early 1990s. Islamic, ethnic and other separatist groups 
became encouraged of the possibility of gaining power and influence in a region that lost 
its main hegemon, the Soviet Union, and replaced it with weaker states without a means 
to fight them alone. In effect, the fact that Central Asia has not had a collapse in its 
regional security apparatus has been in some respects a significant accomplishment; but 
the region’s ability to maintain extensive peace and stability has been far from ideal. 
Energy pipelines are a dear asset for the energy industry and governments that 
rely on them to ship their resources to the world. Without them, Central Asia would not 
have a means to generate an economy worthy of global attention. Since the region is 
landlocked, Central-Asian pipelines must pass through other states, notably Russia. 
Russia, in order to profit from the region’s geographical handicap, will require all 
Central-Asian states to pay transit fees for using their national pipelines.2 This situation 
does not include the fact that Russian gas firm Gazprom owns many pipelines in Central 
Asia, especially Turkmenistan, that have contractual arrangements that give Gazprom a 
significant share of revenue of oil and gas that trvel through Central Asia itself.3 
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Without having a united policy to eliminate Russia’ bility to profit from Central Asia’s 
oil and gas at the expense of Central-Asian governmnts that rely on this revenue for 
subsistence, existing pipelines will continue to be a “necessary evil” for Central Asia and 
for its energy-sector development. 
Of all the areas of the former Soviet Union, Central Asia has had the least amount 
of democratization or free-market development in the past twenty years. The Uzbekistan 
example shows that leaders of these states have been willing to sever valuable foreign 
relationships to preserve their rule, even if these political entrenchments make a country 
more reliant on an unscrupulous energy partner, like Russia. As shown in the previous 
chapter, civil society is not a static factor in the political economy of the region. It has 
high expectations for selfishly benefiting from the region’s energy prowess and the lofty 
rhetoric coming from the region’s rulers. Cities like Astana and Ashgabat are symbols of 
the newfound wealth that have encapsulated the “boom times” in Central Asia; but many 
citizens still have not equally experienced a rise in living standards or in security due to 
the growth in the energy sector. Since the voting system and other traditional forms of 
public referenda are unpredictable or completely unavailable in the region, citizens have 
resorted to protests and to violence to voice their displeasure with the ruling class.4 
Examples of political unrest from civil society exist throughout the region and are 
easy to find, but, for the sake of highlighting the dangerous proximity between civil 
unrest and the energy sector, Kazakhstan shows this unwanted intimacy most clearly. The 
most recent and most prominent example of violence relating to the energy sector was 
during the Zhanaozen riots of 2011, which coincided with the twentieth anniversary of 
                                                 
4 Ostrowski, Wojciech. Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 90. 
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Kazakhstan’s independence from the Soviet Union.5 Zhanaozen is an oil-producing town 
in the south-western Mangystau Province where oil wrkers had gone on strike months 
before the riots over raising pay. 
The national government, located in the eastern parts of the country, ruled the 
strike illegal and ordered the termination of many employees.6 One of Nazarbaev’s 
firings was directed towards his son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, from the top post of the 
nation’s sovereign wealth fund, Samruk-Kazyna, which is one-hundred-percent owner of 
the state energy firm KazMunaiGaz, which employed the workers who triggered the 
Zhanaozen riots.7 As of 2012, no meaningful reforms in democracy or in transparency 
had occurred, despite some symbolic gestures to placate international observers. In fact, 
Kazakh courts have sentenced many alleged leaders of the protest movements and riots to 
high-level executives, managers, a police officer and workers to multi-year prison terms.8 
This is an addition to the severe response from the Kazakh government against the rioters 
at the time of the riots. In addition to the tens of deaths and injuries, Kazakhstan ordered 
a “state of emergency” in Mangystau province that included an entry/exit blockade and a 
severing of internet communication and mobile phones for around twenty days.9 
Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev have clearly shown the world that it will not negotiate over 
the state of its energy sector with its citizens or energy workers. In the past, however, 
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Kazakh authorities were willing to exploit civil society and their discontent and 
aspirations for a better life to their advantage. 
From research from Ostrowski, in the late 1990s, with the assistance of local 
western-Kazakh governments, the workers and general population of western-Kazakh 
provinces became critical of foreign energy companies, like Chevron, in order to force 
them to spend money to generate local jobs, local infrastructure projects and other 
initiatives for the benefit of the Kazakh people.10 According to Kazakh officials in the 
western regions, pressure on these companies was effective.11 With the help of civil 
society, authorities had established an unwritten rule that required foreign companies to 
allocate funds to officials for the stated use of benefiting the local government’s 
constituents through initiatives like infrastructure projects and job-training programs.12 
For the foreign firms, this was a necessary and beara le cost of business; and the 
provincial governments greatly benefited because their popularity increased with little 
effort or financial sacrifice on their part. 
The differences between the discontent of the late 1990s and of Zhanaozen in 
2012 are well defined. As Ostrowski explains, previous societal pressure from energy 
employees and society were once stimulated with government help against foreign 
energy companies.13 Recent unrest, which was much more violent, was a clash between 
society and the government in the energy sector. Thoug  these two instances of unrest are 
prima facie discrete, the manners in which governments use energy to promote their 
legitimacy at the expense of a foreign energy entity’s coerced contributions to society are 
a tenuous platform to establish a foundation for steady rule. As years progress, society 
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becomes used to the idea that government and energy resources will satisfy its needs and 
demands unfailingly. Since local government tends to be the most vociferous in taking 
credit for local development, the people will look t wards the government for their praise 
and scorn. When life for the average person worsens or, even, stagnates in improvement, 
then people who have little other recourse to voice their concerns will dissent against 
their political and corporate superiors in ways that get attention. 
The events in Zhanaozen appear to show similarity to a society that had grown 
frustrated with the failures of governmental promises spurred by private-sector 
assistance. For example, one resident of Zhanaozen stated that the people produce the oil 
and live in a “dilapidated town” in which the government “promised to do a lot 
but…haven’t done anything yet.”14 This sentiment represents much of those who 
protested and rioted against the government that, at least since the 1990s, had a policy of 
obliging foreign firms to cooperate with the government. These foundations for 
governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the people have buckled and, thus, generated 
political instability in the center of Kazakhstan’s energy wealth. The other energy-rich 
countries of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are worried about the prospects of civil unrest 
close to their energy sectors, and, without political and economic reforms, repression 
appears to be the only remedy to this challenge. As long as the relationship among private 
firms, governments and civil society remain arranged as they have been in western 
Kazakhstan, the problem of political instability will remain critical in the foreseeable 
future. 
More conventional forms of regional unrest like terrorism and separatism largely 
remain a challenge for southern Central Asia, including Uzbekistan; but the means by 
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which these facilitators of instability survive have become more sophisticated. The 
threats of organizations like the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) to Uzbekistan’s 
government continue to plague Karimov and its ability to develop its energy sector 
without fear of sabotage or national instability. In recent years, with the poor border 
security and proliferation of drug manufacturing in Afghanistan, the drug trade and 
human trafficking have become huge businesses for terrorist groups and other rebel 
factions in Central Asia.15 This activity generates billions of dollars and securing 
significant areas of Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan, where terrorists and rebels can 
find use their funds and control of land to develop their operations in Central Asia against 
governments and other forms of recognized authority. 
To help Uzbekistan and other states combat these thr ats, Central-Asian 
governments along with Russia and China have establi hed task forces under the auspices 
of multilateral organizations like the CSTO and the SCO; but they have not been 
sufficient factors in eliminating the menaces as promised. With the United States 
scheduled to withdraw completely from Afghanistan by mid-decade, Central-Asian 
challenges to combat the finances of terrorists and rebels will only intensify in the future. 
If terrorists and other separatists are allowed to proliferate in Central Asia, then other 
states like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which have no recent history of radicalism 
from the south, may become vulnerable.16 As Kazakhstan continues to struggle with the 
violence and unrest in East Kazakhstan and its neighbors in Xinjiang Province, China, the 
potential convergence of discrete but similarly threatening forms of instability and chaos 
will further endanger the prospects of energy development throughout the region. 
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Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 19-20. 
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CHALLENGES OF CORRUPTION AND POOR ECONOMIC M ISMANAGEMENT  
As stated previously, Central Asia has little experience in business in the global 
economy that required cooperation with companies and governments under generally 
accepted principles of transparency, fair competition and the elimination of corruption. 
Unfortunately, Central-Asian energy firms and governmental counterparts have had many 
numerous instances of transgressing from ethical business practices and have committed 
acts of financial corruption, including hiding energy revenues intended for public use in 
offshore accounts. Though Central-Asian states are not the only ones to be guilty of these 
unscrupulous practices, continuing behavior in these instances will only impede good 
relations with the global energy sector that holds the money and technical skills to 
produce efficiently and to export effectively oil and gas reserves. 
For example, Kazakh energy governance is often denoted as a “corporatist” 
system that is in part a relic of the Soviet characteristics of energy trade between Almaty 
and Moscow. Based on Ostrowski’s analysis, “corporatism” is a system in which party 
interests at the elite level strongly influence the objectives charted and the decisions made 
for a government and its closely connected NOC.17 In Kazakhstan, where its elites are 
accustomed to generating energy policy and to forming corporate frameworks in the 
interest of the single-party platform, this practice of “corporatism” continues during 
Nazarbaev’s rule. This custom also exists in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the 
single-party goals are greatly intertwined with energy policy and relations with energy 
firms. 
The problems with this system is that political-party objectives and those of the 
energy sectors do not often match, which could leadto internecine elitist strife or societal 
unrest. When the elites are in conflict, the side with the privilege of “legitimate violence” 
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often in the form of access to the military usually prevails. In Central Asia, the 
governments almost always win arguments over energy leaders, as was shown in the 
Zhanaozen riots in 2011 and the punishments in 2012. 
The corporatist system is far from being a constantly beneficial relationship 
between political interests and business goals, which is why the governments, led by their 
autocratic rulers, have ensured that family or close confidants are in power in their energy 
interests. For example, Nazarbaev’s son-in-law led Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund 
that was in control of the country’s many energy firms before he was sacked after the 
Zhanaozen riots. The sovereign wealth fund has beenundergoing structural changes that 
include reducing bureaucracy and improving the fund’s “strategy” in developing the 
country’s economy.18 
The most recent head of the sovereign wealth fund and the chief advocate of the 
fund’s reforms is Umirzak Shukeev, who, like Nazarbaev, comes from southeastern 
Kazakhstan and led one of the southern provinces in the country before becoming the 
head of the nation’s sovereign wealth fund.19 This is important because the historically 
nomadic Kazakh culture tends to stay loyal to members closest to the regional 
homelands, and this closeness between Nazarbaev and Shukeev represents how leaders 
are careful in placing loyal members of the elite in important national positions. Not all 
countries have consistently been as careful to appoint figures as cautiously as 
Kazakhstan, but no country in the region has given th  responsibility of the energy sector 
to disloyal figures; and when the integrity of the energy sector is under threat, the heads 
of state of each government act quickly to make a quick change, even if it is family. 
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Continuing this process of sudden changes in leadership could make domestic or foreign 
energy firms suspicious of the region and its ability to be good energy partners. 
Corruption remains a significant problem in Central Asia, and elites often poorly 
hide their transgressions. For example, one of the earliest forms of corruption associated 
with the energy sector came from Nazarbaev’s relationships with Mobil oil in the 1990s. 
Mobil’s perks to Nazarbaev included access to private estates in the Bahamas and vast 
financial down payments. For access to the country’s oil reserves, Nazarbaev further 
demanded from Mobil a private jet, a tennis court bilt for him in Kazakhstan and “four 
mobile television units for his daughter’s” national media empire.20 Besides this atypical 
form of bribery, Kazakhstan and other states have participated in more conventional acts 
of corruption. 
The most common example of corruption involves the divesting of energy 
revenues to bank accounts outside the country. In Kazakhstan, international investigators 
caught Nazarbaev having around $1 billion stored in a Swiss bank account filled with 
funds that were intended for public use.21 This case is in addition to a series of bank 
accounts in the British Virgin Islands, Liechtenstein and Switzerland of up to $78 million 
that consisted of “fees” paid by foreign firms for their activities in the country.22 The 
accounts were set up by businessman James Giffen, who had close ties to Kazakhstan, 
who was tried in the United States for money launderi g with a foreign government.23 
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This scandal, known as “Kazakhgate,” gave post-Soviet Kazakhstan a reputation of a 
typical energy-rich kleptocratic government that bears similar characteristics of the 
“Dutch Disease.” As of recent years, Kazakhstan has not lost all its American and 
Western business relationships, but these and otherinstances of corrupt behavior force 
many governments and firms to be restrained from interacting with the country.24 
Turkmenistan has had instances of its leaders holding offshore accounts, as well. 
During the reign of Niyazov, the Turkmen accounting authorities had marked 75% of its 
energy revenues as “off-budget,” meaning that those funds are not intended for use on 
public goods or the energy sector. These revenues went to Niyazov’s personal Deutsche 
Bank account worth from $2 billion to $3 billion.25 The investigations surrounding the 
siphoned funds started after Niyazov’s death. The inv stigation, supervised by the next 
president Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedow, led to the arr st of Niyazov’s security chief 
Akmura Redzhepov and Niyazov’s close business associate Murad Agayev for corruption 
associated, in part, to the foreign accounts. Redzhpov received a 20 year prison term, 
and Agayev received a 17-year prison term.26 Since his actions that were an attempt to 
show his tough stance against corruption, president B rdymukhamedow has resumed his 
country’s corrupt practices. International observers such as Crude Accountability have 
alleged that Berdymukhamedow had personally amended en rgy laws to allow him to 
have “exclusive authority” to administer energy resources throughout the country as well 
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as to resume the practice of offloading over 75% of energy revenues from the federal 
budget.27 
These examples are some of the reasons that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan remain some of the most corrupt countries on earth. According to 
Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan are tied as the fifth most corrupt state in the world with Kazakhstan having a 
comparatively higher rating, though having a poor rating nonetheless.28 With this 
reputation as a corrupt region of the world, Central Asia’s energy producers will continue 
to struggle with this epithet for many years, even if the countries make honest attempts to 
suppress corruption. Nevertheless, the symbiotic nature between government and energy 
sectors, which the leaders use to enrich their lifestyl s and to strengthen their power, will 
keep corruption as a significant Central-Asian challenge in the future. 
THREAT OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COOPTING CENTRAL -ASIAN AUTONOMY  
Central Asian states have a mixed impression to multilateral organizations. 
Turkmenistan, with its policy of “positive neutrality,” has refused to join most 
multilateral organizations. Uzbekistan has been generally welcoming of multilateral 
organizations but has refused to participate in many instances based on its insistence of 
protecting its sovereignty. Kazakhstan represents Central Asia’s champion of promoting 
multilateral cooperation throughout Central Asia and beyond. Kazakhstan has embarked 
on this track to promote its own interests and to establish a global reputation that would 
make it a separate power from Moscow, but Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia are 
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vulnerable to being coopted from Central-Asian organiz tions led by Russia and China, 
which could compromise the region’s energy autonomy. 
Kazakhstan’s Narsultan Nazarbaev was one of the first post-Soviet leaders to call 
for organizations to unite the former Soviet Union into multilateral organizations. The 
first organization to form under this spirit was the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) that had gone through many membership changes and, though promoted with high 
expectations, has been criticized by officials of frmer-Soviet states as ineffective in 
promoting Kazakh or other Central-Asian interests throughout the Soviet sphere.29 
Nazarbaev then helped to establish the Eurasian Ecoomic Community (EurAsEC) in 
1996, which helped to create the Customs Union among Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan 
in 2010.30 These organizations and others have helped Kazakhstan’s image in the region 
and the former Soviet Union by displaying itself as a force for unity, but these groups 
have had little effect in promoting Kazakh interests and strategy against other states. The 
organizations that have the most potential in conveyi g influence towards other states are 
organizations predominately led by Russia and China. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) have each existed for at least ten years first as treaties and 
then as full organizations. The SCO, started in Shang i in 1996, consists of all Central-
Asian states, except Turkmenistan; China; Russia and many other observers.31 This 
organization concerns itself with security and economic issues. The CSTO is known as a 
“military alliance” consisting of Central-Asian states except Turkmenistan and, recently, 
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Uzbekistan but including Belarus.32 While Russia leads the CSTO due to its military 
superiority, the SCO was a Chinese brainchild and remains mostly a Chinese-led 
organization based on its economic superiority. Thoug  Central-Asian states make up the 
majority of members of each organization, the influence within each organization mostly 
lies outside Central-Asian control, which leaves Central Asia vulnerable to having their 
domestic affairs under the control of Russian, Chinese or other foreign influence. 
Control of military affairs in Central Asia is a powerful means to control Central-
Asian states, and Russia stands to benefit the mostif the SCO or CSTO are allowed to 
control regional military relations. Having close military relationships, including having 
military bases in Central Asia, gives a state like Russia or China a substantial advantage 
in promoting or protecting energy interests in the region for the benefit of the foreign 
military power. The SCO, as a military and economic organization, could also bring 
allow China or Russia to have more control over regional affairs. The main way to 
promote economic influence through the SCO would be to preclude other foreign 
economic powers, like India or the U.S., from having a strong presence in Central-Asian 
economic affairs, including energy affairs. If Russia and China had the ability to develop 
energy resources like European and American energy firms have, then, perhaps, China 
and Russia could be able to convince these countries to agree on restrictions to non-SCO 
approved economic activity. Russia is also unlikely to coerce states to ratify a treaty only 
allowing Russian and Chinese firms to operate in the region since it knows that removing 
Western firms would necessarily degrade the regional energy infrastructure and, 
therefore, reduce the amount of oil and gas going through Russian pipelines. These 
realities, however, can change; and, as long as the legal, military and economic apparatus 
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to allow foreign control of Central Asia continue to exist, Central Asian states remain 
susceptible to foreign control in the future. 
This potential problem from entangling foreign allinces is one of the many 
challenges that endanger regional growth in the energy sector and the rest of the region. 
The self-inflicted problems of corruption and poor economic management have given the 
region the unwanted sobriquet of a very corrupt part of the world. Many foreign 
governments and firms, especially from the West, would be greatly cautious in future 
relations if these trends in corruption or mismanagement continue. Instability from civil 
society or from terrorists or separatist factions presents a further challenge to energy 
production and to the viability of governments. States have resorted to repression and 
harsh punishment to quash uprisings and other threats to regional peace and stability; but 
these habits cannot last forever, and states have mny opportunities to be able to promote 
energy development, stability and prosperity without harsh recourse or the need to 
strengthen entangling alliances with powers that want to seize control over Central Asia. 
Central Asia will only be able to resolve these challenges and achieve its goals for energy 
and economic development only through region-wide, constructive measures without 
significant foreign intrusion. If these Central-Asian challenges are not resolved 
effectively, then the region will have squandered the potential to be an influential global 




Chapter 4: Opportunities for Central-Asian States to Promote the Most 
Effective Energy Policy 
Central-Asian states that had been part of the Soviet Union have made great 
strides to transition from their status as closed societies living at the behest of Moscow to 
states with greatly increased domestic sovereignty and increased impact on global 
relations. As noted in the previous chapter, the thr e main energy states are far from 
achieving their full potential. Despite these daunting problems, these three states have at 
their disposal many means to resolve their domestic problems and to develop strategically 
their energy policies to have the most optimal energy relationship among many markets 
that ensure domestic autonomy and the prevention of an emerging monopsony market, 
like Russia. 
This chapter will outline the key objectives shared with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to be viable energy exporters in Central Asia. Then, 
accounting for the region’s challenges, this section will discuss how each state can 
resolve their challenges so that each state can better achieve their objectives. One avenue 
by which states can achieve beneficial energy policies is to institute a “multi-vector” 
policy of which Kazakhstan has been its largest promoter. Then, the section discusses the 
opportunities the region has to utilize its auspicious geographic location to be an energy 
“bridge” between East and West and between North and South. In explaining the 
potential as an energy “bridge,” this section will discuss the logistical and economic 
advantages and challenges in Central Asia’s ability to be an energy “bridge” and a 
“pivot” wedged within Russia, China, South Asia and the West. This chapter will 
conclude that the region is able to become a base for a strong, productive energy 
relationship between Central-Asian exporters and foreign consumers that increases the 
liquidity of the market and the energy-policy autonomy of the Central Asian region. 
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OBJECTIVES FOR CENTRAL -ASIAN STATES TO ACHIEVE  
The Central Asian States, in spite of their separate histories of domestic energy 
policy, share many common objectives that will not only improve their domestic energy 
conditions but also contribute to improving the region’s collective situations. In order to 
promote their position on the global energy market, the three main Central-Asian energy 
producers must be able to achieve their goals of prmoting prosperity, developing good 
intra-regional relations, safeguarding their energy-policy autonomy and maintaining 
stability. All Central-Asian states, energy producers and others will be able to engage 
with their neighbors in its own interests and to guide its energy future. 
First Objective: Establishing a Regional Energy Policy for All Sectors 
First, establishing an energy-policy that promotes prosperity for all people is 
essential for maintaining security and stability for regional energy policy. The most ideal 
way to advance this goal is not by permanently issuing remittances permanently to every 
citizen. This would make the people accustomed to relying on the government’s coffers 
for sustenance; and, on a larger level, this reliance has been shown within governmental 
operations. As shown in OPEC and in Russia, the states of the CIS, including many 
Central Asian states, general revenues among oil exporting states are greatly reliant on 
the price of oil.1 
Because states like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have not 
adequately diversified their economies beyond the energy sectors, they have experienced 
sharp rises and drops in GDP caused by volatile energy markets, leaving Central Asia at 
the mercy of global demand, especially with regional exports through Russia to Europe.2 
In addition, the region has remained increasingly re iant on oil and gas to maintain the 
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government’s legitimacy and power. If the price of oil and gas are high, then the region 
becomes prosperous; and if energy revenues decrease either by a reduction in oil prices or 
from a reduction in energy production occurs, then the country enters into recession or 
depression and the nation’s instability rises.3  
Fortunately for these states, simple policies impleented over a long, 
uninterrupted period can alleviate much of these predicaments. Central Asian states can 
adopt multi-faceted energy strategies. These include establishing energy funds, or 
“sovereign wealth funds,” with responsible management instead of those which allow for 
investment abroad and not for needed projects for domestic economic and societal 
development, as has been seen in Kazakhstan.4 
The first step would be setting up a strategically planned “sovereign wealth fund,” 
like those of Norway and Russia, that will fund projects and programs over a long-period 
that secures energy revenues gradual, strategic investment for robust growth of the 
economy and society. A government could implement another fund that would serve in 
emergencies to inject emergency reserves to keep essential government services running 
and to preserve stability when energy revenues plummet, like during the financial crisis 
of 2008 and 2009. 
For many years, Kazakhstan has had a program similar to a sovereign wealth fund 
to contribute to projects and funds for economic growth and civil society development. 
After the 2008 collapse of oil prices, however, Kazakhstan found itself having to use its 
two sovereign wealth funds to inject emergency capital to protect the country from a 
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larger economic crisis.5 According to Kazakhstan’s minister of economic development 
Kayrat Kelimbetov, has noted that the Kazakh budget oft n “sterilizes” billions of dollars 
in energy revenue to these funds, but continue to be an object of last resort in order to 
stop an economic “vicious circle” during a global crisis, as was the case in 2008.6 
The case in Kazakhstan represents those of the rest of the region. Any sovereign 
wealth fund, current or planned, would serve primarly as a means to stop emergencies 
from exacerbating rather than promoting long-term objectives in the economy and in 
society. This situation exists because governments are much more interested in 
preserving stability in the short-term than prosperity in the long-term since the everyday 
needs of the people because the threats facing the region are much more sensitive to the 
region’s security and stability than in other countries. The riots in Zhanaozen have shown 
that while Kazakhstan may not have chronic unemployment like other states, frustration 
and riots in the oil-rich areas can force a governme t to take this threat seriously.7 
What helps Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser ext nt, Uzbekistan, is that 
while the governments remain repressive and these often respond to unrest with violent 
measures, the energy funds amassed over many years provide the means by which to 
appease the population by providing adequate housing, infrastructure and other services. 
Though each would require some sovereign funds to be diverted at short notice, the 
governments can easily afford the projects. One additional way is to utilize foreign direct 
investment in order to utilize better energy revenues towards the economy and society by 
wisely attracting and using foreign direct investment for purposes other than energy. 
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Because Central Asia has vast energy reserves, the energy sector has received 
around 90% of received foreign direct investment (FDI) while other sectors remain well 
underfunded.8 The key to changing this trend is to use FDI to fund not only energy 
projects, but also in sectors outside this sector in order to diversify the economy and to 
allow more citizens to participate in the domestic economy. Though progress has been 
slow, the region has been able to attract investments outside the energy sector through 
FDI and other schemes. 
For example, Kazakhstan has promoted collaboration in i dustries like aviation, 
military, nuclear and manufacturing. For example, currently, like in energy, these projects 
are publicized as joint ventures between Kazakh groups and foreign firms that have the 
technology and knowledge in their respective fields. Some of the dual-partnerships bind 
Russian firms with Kazakhstan; but an increasing number of them originate from other 
foreign countries, like China, the U.S. and India. In another example, Uzbekistan has 
been able to get commitments from states like South Korea for investment in 
“information technology and education.”9 These initiatives serve two purposes: to 
introduce or to reinvigorate new industries and firms into Central Asia and to spread 
Central-Asian cooperation outside Russia. 
Also, more effective energy policies can promote healt  and peace for people who 
do not have access to services that oil-rich countries like Norway and Saudi Arabia have. 
For example, access to basic services, like plumbing and health care is still lacking in 
many areas of Central Asia, especially away from cities. Good housing and quality of life 
                                                 
8 Aizhan, Khoich, and Madiyarova Diana Makaevna. "Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic 
Growth in Kazakhstan." 2011 International Conference on Sociality and Economics Development (2011): 
414-19.  http://http://www.ipedr.com/vol10/78-S10031.pdf, p. 414 
9 Spechler, Dina Rome and Martin C. Spechler, “Uzbekistan among the great powers,” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies, Volume 42, Issue 3, Sep. 2009, p. 358. 
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remains elusive, even for those working in the energy industry. To alleviate this problem, 
countries have the ability to spend energy funds to develop infrastructure, housing and 
health care facilities that would improve the living situations of their citizens at a 
nugatory cost compared to broader energy revenues.  Uzbekistan has been able to work 
with the U.S. to collaborate on projects to promote health care and housing, as well as 
“micro-credit” programs to spread loans to those who ould not otherwise afford them.10 
These initiatives would require leadership to foreg extra profits toward their personal 
wealth and to certain “pet projects” or white elephants, but the consequences of 
eschewing self-gains for societal gains are just as selfish as conventional Central-Asian 
practice. 
People will not appreciate past good deeds if their present conditions are 
unacceptable, and governments should not rely on the past to legitimize their present or 
future rule. In these countries in which the governme t appoints itself as protectors and 
benefactors of the people, it will be the first institution to which the people will blame 
first. Wise energy policies would help alleviate this daunting situation. 
Objective Two: Promoting Energy Relationships within Central-Asian States 
Secondly, Central-Asian states need to develop energy relationships between 
themselves that give them autonomy from other energy powers and to give them leverage 
against their energy consumers. Achieving this willprevent the region from being agents 
of a foreign dominated “tributary system,” like during the Soviet times or what modern 
Russia wishes to achieve. As previously shown, the region’s governments is already tied 
together through pipelines and through export and import deals that see oil and gas flow 
from Central-Asian producers to consumers within the region. Many oil and gas do not 
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transport from the region without crossing more than one Central-Asian state, and one oil 
and gas project could be signed by one Central-Asian t te, but the effects will spread 
throughout the region. Therefore, region-wide cooperation is absolutely essential. 
To reiterate, the CAC pipeline was one of the first oil pipelines to link Central 
Asia to the Soviet pipeline system, commissioned over 35 years ago.11 The only other 
major regional pipeline that connects all three major Central-Asian energy states to a 
foreign consumer is the Central Asia-China pipeline commissioned in 2009.12 The 
completion of this pipeline is a product of pan-regional cooperation to collaborate with a 
new partner, China, for the interests of all involved. In order to continue securing projects 
like Central Asia-China pipeline, all countries must work together transparently and 
goodheartedly to improve further their energy infrast ucture and to preserve energy 
exports abroad. 
Within Central Asia, countries are reliant on each ot er for their energy needs in a 
labyrinth pipeline system that sees net energy exporters needing to import oil and gas to 
populated regions and net energy importers exporting o l and gas to countries that have 
no meaningful energy assets of their own. As shown, Kazakhstan has been struggling to 
transport their oil and gas prowess from the energy-rich, unpopulated western regions to 
the population centers in the East, although the country is striving to construct the 
transport infrastructure to become self-reliant. The country, however, is working with 
China to develop a gas pipeline, known as the Beyneu-Bozoy-Akbulak gas pipeline, from 
western Kazakhstan to its southern regions to connect to the Central Asia-China 
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Pipeline.13 For the time being, however, Kazakhstan will remain needing oil and gas from 
import partners like Russia and Uzbekistan, but the pipeline benefits greatly 
Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors that have the means to expand their pipeline networks 
to Kazakhstan’s new pipeline and build better cooperation. 
As the region becomes more integrated with the helpof states like China, actors 
in the region have less to gain by remaining antagonistic, arrogant or intrusive towards 
each other. For countries like Uzbekistan, which has an older, more complex Soviet-era 
system has been exporting oil and gas to unstable Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which do 
not have domestic resources of their own. Uzbekistan is still has a tendency to 
antagonizing Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan by demanding hi her fees for exporting oil and 
gas and by cutting off gas exports to either country.14 In Turkmenistan, its pipeline 
infrastructure must pass through Kazakhstan and sometimes Uzbekistan in order to reach 
customers in Russia or in China. From this pipeline configuration, a breakdown in 
relations between any of these Central-Asian states will be disastrous to the region; 
therefore, good intraregional relations are critical for a promising energy future for all 
Central-Asian states. 
Fortunately for the region, states have been able to work together to improve their 
energy situation through mutual collaboration among Central-Asian countries. The most 
prominent recent example of good intraregional cooperation is the negotiations that led to 
the Central Asian-China natural-gas pipeline, which, as mentioned, contains lines “A” 
and “B” as well as a planned third line.15 Being one of the most ambitious pipeline 
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projects since the fall of the Soviet Union, three countries, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, would all have to agree on all conditions associated with the pipeline, the 
natural-gas sources for the pipeline and the pipeline’s route.  
Since then all three transit countries have worked with China to make separate 
deals to improve the performance of the pipeline and to use the pipeline and the 
relationship with China to improve a state’s domestic energy situation. For example, in 
2011, Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz recently bought Turkmen natural gas from Chinese 
CNPC supplies held under agreement in Turkmenistan.16 This deal alleviates a sudden 
shortage of Uzbek gas imports. In addition to negotiating the construction of an 
additional gas pipeline to accompany the Central Asia-China pipeline, Uzbekistan agreed 
to sell more natural gas from Uzbek sources, to accmpany Turkmen gas from Yolotan 
field.17 Turkmenistan has been able to use Chinese engineering and funds to continue to 
develop the natural-gas behemoth. This relationship beginning in 2006 has allowed China 
to build pipelines and business relationships that ve been parlayed into strategic 
partnerships not only for China’s advantage but also to increase cooperation among 
Central Asian states. 
Another achievement in promoting intraregional cooperation was working 
together to negotiate the pipeline route for the Central Asia-China pipeline. For the transit 
states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, agreeing to the pipeline’s route required regional 
support and cooperation. For Uzbekistan, the country recently made a deal with China in 
in which the country will supply gas for a newly constructed third pipeline in the Central 
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Asia-China pipeline system that will run parallel to the other two pipelines to China.18  
Therefore, as the country will be a transit state for Turkmen gas, it will supply gas to 
China that will add revenues to the Uzbeks and streng hen relations between China and 
Uzbekistan. 
Kazakhstan, it not only worked with its neighbors to finalize a route within its 
borders but also achieved an agreement to supply the pipeline with its own gas. To 
reiterate, China and Kazakhstan plan to complete the Beyneu-Bozoi-Shymkent pipeline 
from Beyneu in western Kazakhstan to Shymkent in eastern Kazakhstan where it will 
join with the Central Asia-China pipeline.19 The pipeline is scheduled for completion in 
March 2013. As a bonus to Kazakhstan, a sizable portion of transported gas will supply 
cities in South Kazakhstan that rely on Russian or Uzbek supplies, such as Jambil and 
Almaty. To quote Kazakhstan’s First Vice Prime Minister Umirak Shukeyev, “Our 
problem of dependence of southern regions on imported gas will be resolved.”20  The true 
extent of obviating foreign supplies notwithstanding, from Chinese investment and 
cooperation, Kazakhstan has earned a priceless dividend in their participation of the 
Central Asia-China pipeline. 
Once all three parallel lines A, B and C are fully online, China will be receiving at 
least 60 bcm of natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.21 This 
pipeline has been a collaborative effort on the three Central-Asian states that was 
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independent from undue influence from other states lik  Russia or the United States, and 
the fact that all three states will ultimately supply the pipeline system is a remarkable 
achievement in cooperation since the fall of the Soviet Union. Aside from this project, the 
region still has room to improve. 
One case in which Central Asia has yet to find a breakthrough deal despite much 
effort is related to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) negotiations. If completed, this 
pipeline would stretch from the Caspian coasts of Turkmenistan and, potentially, 
Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, thus passing around Russia.22 Nonetheless, both eastern and 
western sides of the Caspian could do more to improve the prospects of this pipeline. One 
way to lessen this problem is for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan should cosign their 
supplies together in uniting the regional resolve for the pipeline, like with Central Asia-
China. In addition, the TCP negotiations are an ideal backdrop to create a defining 
moment for Central-Asian diplomacy towards its neighbor Azerbaijan in a reasonable, 
mutual partnership without the diplomatic assistance of a great power. These countries, 
however, are allowing politics, mistrust and, someti s, irrational behavior to mutilate 
any possibility of a deal. When states become motivated to make a deal, the opportunity 
to start meaningful work on TCP will remain available when they are ready. 
As previously shown, Turkmenistan has evinced its infamous reputation for 
abruptly severing contract talks for the most dubios of reasons, and negotiations 
surrounding the TCP are no exception. Kazakhstan could have had its breakthrough 
moment in diplomacy and post-Soviet intraregional re ations by being effective 
consultants towards Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan or, at least, be ombudsmen between 
the two countries. The major dispute creating the rift between the Caspian littoral states is 
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the disputed claims of the Serdar/Kypaz gas field deep in the Caspian.23 Like with 
Central Asia-China, Kazakhstan has a great opportunity handed to them to achieve a 
breakthrough that unites both eastern and western poles of the Caspian, especially amid 
the smaller sources of conflict that prevent larger benefits for each. 
On a broader sense Uzbekistan has shown initiative in supporting its neighbor 
Turkmenistan in their attempts to diversify their energy network. Uzbek president Islam 
Karimov, during an official visit to Turkmenistan i2010, he stated that the Central Asia-
China pipeline is a great step towards diversifying ts energy structure that gives 
motivation to Central-Asian states as well as other countries that want to overcome 
“artificially created obstacles in the way of transporting not only of hydrocarbons, but 
also other resources.”24 Karimov also stated that this pipeline with the very close 
relationship with Turkmenistan shows the achievement of such projects on the way to the 
modernization of both states and the increase in liv g standards on both sides.25 Though 
the venue in Turkmenistan required Karimov to compli ent unctuously his Turkmen 
host, Karimov’s comments underscore the longing for autonomy and influence in their 
own energy affairs and to the global energy markets. 
Furthermore, the Uzbek president related this breakthrough with a resolution in 
the UN General Assembly on February 3, 2009 entitled “Reliable and stable transit of 
energy and its role in ensuring sustainable development and international cooperation.”26 
Though the resolution is non-binding and has no actionable clauses, this resolution was 
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written and primarily sponsored by Turkmenistan; therefore, this resolution is a public 
pronouncement of Turkmenistan’s views on energy diversification beyond much doubt. 
The resolution acknowledges the “initiative of Turkmenistan to convene” a conference in 
2009 on “ensuring the reliable and stable transportati n of energy to international 
markets” as well as “recognizes the need for extensiv  international cooperation 
in…ensuring the reliable transportation of energy to international markets” of which one 
way would be pipelines.27 While purely ceremonial, this resolution is a sharp signal of 
Turkmenistan’s desire to eliminate its overreliance on Russia and to become a base for 
global energy for the international community.  
These actions could make some believe that Turkmenistan is trying to dupe the 
international community into believing that it wants to be a fully participating member of 
the international energy community when, in actualiy, they still want to remain in the 
Russian orbit. This conjecture would be dubious to believe because Turkmenistan would 
not have supported Central Asia-China and other pipeline projects that bypass Russia if 
that were the case. For Turkmenistan and the rest of Central Asia, their ability to promote 
and secure good relations with each other have mostly been effective for the mutual 
benefit of all energy situations; however, many more regional energy challenges to solve 
and initiatives to develop more energy projects still hang over this region and its future. 
Third Objective: Maintain an Autonomous and Well-Managed Energy Sectors in 
Each State  
Thirdly, Central-Asian states need to maintain an energy infrastructure and 
industry that is independent from undue foreign influence and intimidation and that is 
immune from threat from mismanagement and corruption. As seen in previous examples, 
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Central Asian states have often shown the aspiration nd determination to wean their way 
from Russian dominance of their pipeline systems and their energy policies. Russia will 
not voluntarily allow Central-Asian states to act independently from Russian energy 
strategies, so the initiative rests on Central Asia it elf. Achieving this objective requires 
more than having the ability to transport oil and gas to various customers; it further 
necessitates the ability to produce, to recover oil and gas and to refine oil and gas with the 
least amount of nefarious foreign control that would compromise each state’s ability to 
guide their policies for themselves. 
As stated, Central Asian states were aggressive in establishing their sovereignty 
over energy resources in the new independent territories. Upon gaining independence, 
Kazakhstan found itself in control of Tengiz, Presid nt Nazarbaev showed his ability to 
be resilient against the Russians in securing the Tengiz field and as much as the Caspian 
Sea as possible, stating that Kazakhstan will no loger be “an appendage” of Moscow.28 
From the early negotiations with Chevron and with the Russians, Nazarbaev has a record 
of securing an energy industry that is under Kazakh control; however, because the 
country had relied on the Soviet Union and the West for developing its energy reserves, 
Nazarbaev had clear limits to the extent of his ability to keep the upstream (recovery and 
production) Kazakh energy industry free from foreign influence.29 
Like with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also wanted to keep their 
respective industries free from undue foreign influence as possible, but their upstream 
sectors require foreign knowledge to operate effectiv ly and to expand further. As stated 
before, the desired knowledge and skills were best h ld with Americans and some 
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Western firms, but relations between the West and Central Asia had been strained for the 
first years of independence. Uzbekistan and Turkmenista , therefore, struggled to 
maintain their upstream sectors in the 1990s and into the early 2000s with Uzbekistan 
having performed much better than Turkmenistan, mainly due to American assistance 
stemming from the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan. 
Once China became more involved with the entire Central-Asian region, all 
countries benefited from additional projects in their t rritories. Nonetheless, Chinese 
expertise in pipeline engineering had improved greatly. Even Russia’s independent 
engineering firms have been integral to developing ipelines in the last decade, including 
those bypassing Russia. For pipelines originating in Turkmenistan and ending in Iran, 
which were built with Iranian and Turkmen expertise, these lines are much shorter in 
distance and transport less gas per time period than other lines.30 Even the Soviet-era 
Central Asia-Center pipeline has undergone improvements that only foreign, in this case 
Russian, expertise was essential. In short, the Central Asian region still relies on the 
global energy community in order to develop its resources. 
Within the region, Central-Asian states remain reliant on refineries and delivery 
mechanisms that are based outside the region in Russia that are necessary in order for 
Central Asian citizens to have access to petrol, jet fu l, diesel, residential natural gas and 
other consumer fuels. Holding over from the Soviet p riod, refineries in north of 
Kazakhstan in Russia refine much of the oil and gasneeded for commercial and 
governmental enterprises in Kazakhstan and, even, further south.31 Recently, however, 
                                                 
30 “Turkmenistan—Oil & Gas Report, Q2 2012.” Business Monitor Online. Business Monitor 
International, February 2012, p. 28. 
31 Kandiyoti, Rafael. “What price access to the open sas? The geopolitics of oil and gas transmission frm 
the Trans-Caspian republics.” Central Asian Survey. Vol  27, No. 1, March 2008, p. 79. 
 
 70 
the region has shown some improvement in weaning off reliance from Russian and other 
non-Central-Asian refineries. 
In Kazakhstan, the country has recently taken steps o improve its oil and gas 
refinery capabilities. According to BMI, the three main refineries are the Atyrau crude-oil 
refinery, the Pavlodar refinery and Shymkent refinery in South Kazakhstan. These three 
major Kazakh refineries are set to complete massive expansions that will expand daily 
production from 241,000 b/d to over 300,000 b/d at a cost of over $3 billion.32  The 
Atyrau refinery, completed in 1945, is set to increas  capacity by over 11,000 b/d to an 
overall refining capacity of nearly 110,000 b/d. Pavlodar and Shymkent refineries, 
completed in 1978 and 1985 respectively, each have refining capacities between 140,000 
to 150,000 b/d of gasoline and many tens of thousands of b/d more of other fuels. The 
three main refineries have a total refining capacity of 389,746 b/d.33 
Even with this added emphasis on refineries, the country still relies on foreign 
help to keep these refineries online. According to BMI, although KMG now has a 99% 
ownership of Atyrau refinery after acquiring a 50% stake in 2004; however, KMG had to 
make a deal with Sinopec Engineering to expand the refinery to produce petrol and diesel 
fuel to a higher, “Euro-4,” standard and to increase capacity.34 At Pavlodar, KMG, which 
has a 58% stake currently, is thinking of selling a 50% stake to Russia’s TNK-BP; and 
the Shymkent refinery is controlled by a joint venture between CNPC and Kazakh firms 
PetroKazakhstan and KMG.35 This information is not shown to argue that the country 
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needing foreign assistance is necessary troublesome; the fact that Kazakhstan needs 
foreign funds and expertise to ensure that its refineries operate and to reduce its reliance 
on Russian refineries, may leave the country vulnerabl  to foreign policies and interests 
of Russia and China that could work against Kazakhst n’  interests. 
For example, if an economic downturn were to occur in China, the country could 
lose the ability to continue operations at Kazakh refineries or move to sell stakes in other 
ventures, such as the Shymkent refinery. Even more p t ntially troublesome is that the 
Pavlodar refinery, located around 350 km northeast of Astana, imports crude oil from 
Western Siberia to supply the refinery.36 Concerning energy logistics, this relationship 
makes sense for Kazakhstan since importing oil from Western Siberia is more 
economical than delivering oil from the Caspian; however, the country remains 
susceptible to a supply reduction or cutoff that would affect supplies for Kazakhstan’s 
residents in the north, including Astana. 
In resolving this predicament, Kazakh authorities should reasonably see this as an 
opportunity for Kazakhstan to build their first post-Soviet refinery in order to reduce their 
reliance on Russian supplies and to gain better knowledge and expertise necessary to 
build other refineries and other invaluable infrastuc ure throughout Central Asia solely 
with regional expertise. If Kazakhstan were to deci to construct a new oil refinery, the 
cost and expertise would require a great amount of foreign help, likely still to come from 
Russian, Chinese and Western sources. Given the desires of foreign energy firms to 
maintain significant ownership and control of any refinery, Kazakhstan would have to 
share control with foreign firms; however, given the sensitivity of the situation to 
regional energy security and the evolution of the en rgy sectors throughout Central Asia, 
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Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states have no better opportunity than to learn 
diligently and to reproduce the engineering skills and prowess to increase their energy 
autonomy. 
Instead, Central-Asian states are attempting to reduc  their reliance on foreign 
refinery capability when possible. For Kazakhstan, the country is working to reduce 
reliance on Russian-based refineries that refine Kazakh crude. One prominent example is 
the proposal from the Kazakh oil and gas ministry to reduce exports of gas condensate 
from the Karachaganak field to the Orenburg refinery in Russia with a domestic 
alternative. Currently, no refinery to replace Orenburg exists; however, the Karachaganak 
Petroleum Operating consortium (KPO) has announced plans for a new refinery; but 
approval for this project requires agreement from all KPO participants, which 15% is 
controlled by Russia’s Lukoil.37  If the Russian government were to stay in a geopolitical 
character by asking Lukoil not to vote for authorizing the new refinery, the proposed 
refinery would never be built, and Kazakhstan will remain overly reliant on Russia on 
fuels that Kazakhstan needs but cannot develop themselves. Kazakhstan should, 
nonetheless, use this refinery dilemma to incentivize its energy sector and its foreign 
partners to look for opportunities to work together to improve this Kazakh predicament.  
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also reliant on foreign imports from foreign oil-
refineries to supply domestic demand. While Turkmenista  can use its gas reserves to 
supply domestic demand, the country’s demand for oil products requires imports from 
Iran and within Central Asia. According to BMI, with a larger population in a more 
unstable environment, Uzbekistan has three major refineries all owned by Uzbekneftegaz 
and operated by Uzneftepererabotka. The country possesses the only refinery built after 
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1991, Bukhara refinery, built by French and Japanese firms until its completion in 1997.38  
Renovations to older plants were funded with Japanese and European funds. A gas-to-
liquid plant (GTL) in eastern Uzbekistan is under dvelopment with help from South-
African Sasol and Malaysian Petronas, and gas processing plants, in order to remove high 
contents of sulfur from Uzbek natural gas, are planned for renovation based on a deal 
between Uzbekistan and Singapore’s Indorama.39 Turkmenistan’s relationships with 
foreign firms has mostly consisted of Chinese firms like CNPC but has been slow in 
inviting Western and other global firms, which include the most active firms of ENI, 
DragonOil of Dubai, Russia’s Gazprom and Petronas of Malaysia.40 From these 
examples, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are less depen nt on Russian or Chinese firms 
and their funding in order to maintain or to develop their oil and gas infrastructure, 
greatly relying instead on firms located in politically stable and reliable countries mostly 
in the West. 
The chances of Kazakhstan being able to be less reliant on politically 
unpredictable states like China and Russia are improving through the present day; and 
Kazakhstan has shown some initiative to attain a more autonomous energy industry. One 
promising example is KMG announcing that the firm will independently explore offshore 
oil and gas reserves without the use of foreign expertise.41 If successful in finding 
resources, Kazakhstan will certainly achieve a featth  no other Central-Asian state has 
matched by using solely domestic expertise to find mass energy resources. For the rest of 
the country’s energy sector, removing unnecessary foreign influence and threats from 
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endangering their energy industry will take time to achieve; and the country will remain 
greatly reliant on Russia and Soviet-era infrastructure for its energy needs. Though 
geography and logistics remain a severe inhibiting factor, Kazakhstan could work with 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on using their positive relationships with foreign energy 
counterparts to add more partners and to reduce the possibility of one or two countries 
leaving Kazakhstan vulnerable to an energy crisis. For Kazakhstan and the other 
countries that hope to follow it, the best cure for their predicament is to fix it themselves. 
Fourth Objective: Maintaining Peace and Stability throughout the Region 
Fourthly, Central Asian states need to sustain peace and security throughout the 
region not only in areas where energy is produced and transported but also in non-energy 
producing states, like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as well as South Asian states like 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The threats from terrorist networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and around the world continue to be top concerns for Central-Asia, their energy partners 
as well as those active in the region in military, humanitarian and other economic 
schemes unrelated to the energy industry. Internatio l organizations like the SCO and 
CSTO have declared terrorism their most sensitive problem, which has spurred many 
initiatives that bond Russia, China, the U.S. and Central-Asian states in their collective 
fight against terrorism and the drug trade that funds terrorist organizations.42 
Unlike sea tankers, pipeline infrastructure is extrmely difficult to move and to 
evade potential terrorist attacks without constant surveillance. Rupturing or otherwise 
sabotaging one part of a large pipeline can destroy the entire flow of oil and gas for long 
periods of time. For example, the recent mysterious explosion on a Turkmen, Gazprom-
owned gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia in 2009 effectively shut down Turkmen 
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exports of gas for many months; and the Turkmen government lost a massive amount of 
revenue from the explosion.43 
Central-Asian based terrorist organizations, like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), have been threatening the stability of states like Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; and terrorist groups could be making headway in southern 
Kazakhstan. Though the threats are not yet concentrat d in oil and gas-rich areas of 
Central-Asia, like Amu Darya or the western Caspian Sea, the endurance of terrorist 
organizations in Central Asia can strike energy infrastructure and send energy relations in 
the region into crisis. 
Security and stability are of prime importance to all Central-Asian states with 
states like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan already experiencing wars and rebellions since the 
fall of the USSR. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have be n more fortunate, but are not 
immune to these dangers. As seen in the recent Zhanaoze  riots and other western-
Kazakh incidents in the past, Kazakhstan has had experience with post-Soviet instability 
in its most valuable energy sector. With the likelihood of reduced energy demand from 
the global slowdown, Central-Asian states would be wise to invest funds gradually to 
improve the lives of their citizens. In the interests of stability, states would be most 
prudent to invest gradually in infrastructure, housing and social programs, like health 
care, that reflect continuous improvement, rather tan a sudden flash of development 
followed by long periods of stagnation. 
In order to prevent stagnation, countries need to guarantee that investment funds 
will be available in prosperous and in meager times. Spending all revenues at one time 
will result in empty funds later since energy-market cycles always have had hills and 
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troughs. Moreover, citizens will become less appreciative of state-based projects and 
developments once they realize the new hospitals cannot operate because the state cannot 
fund doctors or that new housing complexes are not viable because residents cannot 
afford to live in them or cannot find the means to maintain the integrity of the buildings. 
FINDING THE REGION ’S POTENTIAL  
If Central Asia can effectively exploit these opportunities to their gain, then 
Central Asian states can realistically seize the possibilities afforded to them in the 
twentieth-century in which, like never before, the region can be an independent, discrete 
and pivotal voice for global energy, political and economic affairs. Specifically, the 
countries in the region can be a base by which the Far East, Russia, South Asia and 
Western Eurasia, including the Caucasus, can be link d in energy, trade and economic 
relations, similar to the “Silk Road” era that linked the Orient with the Turkey and the 
West. In this century, the countries of the region can work with their economic and 
energy partners in regional organizations and respective bilateral relations for the 
betterment of all, which is in the best interest of Central Asia. 
This future is possible only with the collective support of all nations in the region 
without any cheating or rebellious behavior against the collective regional interests. 
Turkmenistan, with its unique doctrine of “positive n utrality,” has refused to participate 
with most international organizations officially and has, as previously shown, the most 
infamous reputation for having the most renegade for ign policy in order to preserve 
autocratic rule domestically. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also have had to embark on 
problematic foreign-policy trajectories in order to stabilize their energy industries and 
their grasp on each nation.  
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For the elites in power, their interest lies in garnering the most foreign support, 
especially financial, towards each energy sector, as it serves the bulwark of each state’s 
economic and political strength; and the means by which to gain such strength are located 
around the world, which would be eager to invest if he region introduces the right 
incentives. From the examples provided, the leadership of each energy-rich state, 
including modern-day Turkmenistan, has shown their willingness to an extent to be 
productive members of the international community. Now, their nascent history of global 
cooperation can transform into a pan-generational istitution that creates a region of 
influence rather than a region of vassals. 
Central Asia’s geographic location gives it prime adv ntage to be an interlocutor 
with the present and future geopolitical poles and geoeconomic centers in this century. As 
previously stated, the vast expanse that comprises former-Soviet Central Asia gives the 
region a unique advantage to be not only an energy-p oduction hub but also an energy-
transit hub. Throughout the many pipeline projects that have been laid since the Soviet 
Union, the pipeline that could make the largest geoeconomic and geopolitical impact on 
the region in the twentieth-century will not be laid in the region if at all.  
One of those projects that could catapult the influence and prestige of the region is 
the Nabucco Pipeline. The Nabucco pipeline is herald d Europe’s remedy to its 
dependence on Russian natural gas, which chains their political and economic autonomy 
with respect to Russia. The Nabucco pipeline will on y reach the eastern tip of Azerbaijan 
at the Shah Deniz gas field and move westward to a terminus planned in Austria. The 
connector from Central Asia to a future Nabucco would only be tanker ports to 
gasification terminals in Azerbaijan.44 Ideally, pipelines from fields in Turkmenistan and 
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Kazakhstan would transmit more stockpiles of gas to markets in the West. As previously 
stated, the region needs to come together to make a deal with Azerbaijan and the rest of 
the Nabucco stakeholders to make the entire project, from Amu Darya to Austria a 
success.  
Especially since the feasibility and the construction of the pipeline has been in 
danger from Russian competition, in the form of South Stream, as well as fellow 
European competition to take advantage of Nabucco’s delays, a resolution between 
eastern and western Caspian states is more important than ever. For Azerbaijan, it could 
create a marquee moment for its rising status as a small country with huge influence on 
the world stage. Many argue that the country has much to gain and to lose from the future 
of Nabucco, but the same might not be said about Turkmenistan. If Nabucco or the TCP 
to Azerbaijan is not built, the country will not lose a significant amount of potential 
revenue as the country still has major projects that deliver gas to Russia and to China 
with the potential to establish new relationships with South Asia. Therefore, the fate of 
Turkmenistan in this century will not be tied to Nabucco as much as it would be for 
Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, the region must realize that achieving diversification towards 
Europe, no matter how difficult the sacrifices may become for Turkmenistan or 
Azerbaijan, is almost always preferable than being shut out from them. 
For all three countries, each has the ability to use it  energy resources to create a 
region of growth within and influence beyond. Success in these endeavors will be slow, 
difficult and require some friction within the region and with foreign partners. If, of 
course, Central Asian states can take advantage of the opportunities through partnerships, 
projects and multilateral initiatives in order to achieve those objectives that will set the 
region towards a period of preeminence and prosperity, then the world will be forced to 
reshape its attitudes towards it as well as accommodate its new influence on the world 
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stage. Because Central Asia still resides among many global powers, the region still is 




Chapter 5: Critical Issues Impacting Central Asia’s Energy Future 
INTRODUCTION  
Since Central Asia had achieved independence from the Soviet Union, the region 
has been through a challenging few decades to reach a position to achieve the conditions 
and to seize on the opportunities that their independence, their particular geology, their 
participation with the global economy have afforded to them. As the region continues to 
evolve politically and economically, the future position of the region in the geopolitical 
and geoeconomic spheres is, of course, unknown; however, although the region has 
significant control of its own destiny, understanding the most feasible path of this region 
going forward is dependent on the future of the regions surrounding it. 
This chapter will focus on how certain trends in surro nding areas will affect the 
future of Central Asia’s global energy position. Russia, Iran, and South Asia which 
surround Central Asia, will have significant influence on the future of the region; but the 
ways in which each will exude their clout on the region is not certain. Their current 
intentions, however, are much clearer. For Russia, the former dominant force in the 
region wants to preserve its influence through establi hing political organizations in 
hopes of preserving the region’s closeness with the Russia’s political economy and 
energy strategy. India and Pakistan have wanted new sources of energy for their growing 
economies, but their geographical position and politica  instability have made further 
cooperation difficult; yet it is improving. The Islamic Republic of Iran, being an ally of 
Russia for many years, has haphazardly been an asset to Russia by restricting the ability 
of the region to spread energy contacts southward around Russia. 
This chapter will explain the developments of relations between Russia, South 
Asia and Iran with Central Asia, respectively. Then, the chapter will describe some future 
scenarios for each area that will have profound effects on Central Asia. These scenarios 
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are not predicting the future but are presenting possible courses that each region could 
take in its own respect that would change the course of Central-Asian history. In addition, 
this section will explain the prospects of renewable energy generation in Central Asia 
were technology and the political-economic circumstances favorable to its development. 
Though predicting Central Asia’s future is beyond the scope of this chapter, presenting 
some plausible scenarios is intended to promote thoug t and future ideas in hope of 
achieving better understanding of the world’s last frontiers. 
RUSSIA’S FUTURE IN THE REGION  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has become extremely 
concerned of the increasing influence of foreign powers, like China and the United 
States, in the region at the expense of its own authority over its former Soviet satellites. 
Russia’s main concern is that a resurgent China has infused billions of dollars in 
investment in the energy sector and in the broader economy. More importantly, China’s 
activity in Central Asia has endangered Russia’s broader relationship with China in 
which China purchases energy and arms from Russia while China helps Russian efforts 
to counterbalance American global power.1 
Even with the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, Russia remains very concerned of 
America’s energy interests in the region that have spanned since the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Notably, the perennial presence of Chevron at Tengiz oil field was a relationship 
that the former Soviet Union authorized after years of failed oil-field development by 
Soviet institutions.2 Since then, Russia has found itself having to compete for 
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participation in many Central Asian projects from the U.S., Europe and emerging energy 
player China.  
Although Russia is most likely unable to purge completely non-Russian 
influences from the region, Russia understands that Central Asia is the last region outside 
Russia that remains significantly loyal to Moscow in the twenty-first century. With 
exception of its pipeline networks and energy reserves, Russia has had much of its 
international clout erased; and its global prestige eviscerated. Russia has lost much of its 
Middle East, African and Latin American influence, which has mainly survived from 
arms and military trade though at much lower levels from the Cold War. Domestically, 
Russia’s revenues from the export of Russian oil and gas have not been able to protect the 
country from having budget deficits.3 According to former Russian Finance Minister 
Alexey Kudrin, oil needs to be priced at $117 a barrel in order for Russia’s federal budget 
to be “balanced.”4 With its reduced international position as well as its perilous economic 
situation at home, Russia needs to maintain control of Central-Asian energy assets not 
only for a geopolitical interest but also to amass much needed revenue through transport 
duties, arbitrage and royalties paid to Russia from Central-Asian states. Since the fall of 
the Soviet Union to the present day, Russia’s answer to the challenge of maintaining 
control of this region has been to tie the region into political organizations to compel 
them to act in Russia’s interests in energy policy. 
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Russia’s Use of the CIS and Collective Security Treaty Organization Multilateral 
Organizations 
While Russia had to pursue assertive bilateral diplomacy with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Russia has tried to reaffirm its control over Central Asia 
through new multilateral organizations. Post-Soviet Russia’s first attempt at tying 
Moscow with the region was in its support for the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) in December 1991, which had an initial membership spread to all regions of the 
former Soviet Union except the Baltic states. Russia managed to get all Central-Asian 
states to ratify the treaty to form the new alliance, but Turkmenistan, in what would be a 
trend of strict neutrality, refused to ratify the tr aty. 
This organization, however, has lost much of its relevance among its initial 
members as the former-Soviet satellites failed to find a mandate for the CIS and, partly as 
a result, many members reduced participation or withdrew outright from the organization. 
In the mid-2000s, Georgia and Ukraine each went through “colored revolutions” that 
shifted their foreign interests away from Russia and towards the West. Turkmenistan, 
having the largest gas reserves, has remained uninterested in participating actively in CIS, 
reducing the organizations ability to guide regional energy policy. Also, with the entrance 
of Chinese and American influence, the rest of Central Asia has become less enthusiastic 
in participating in increasing the influence of CIS that could reduce the region’s ability to 
make energy deals and to establish economic and military relationships with China, the 
U.S. and other future partners. Today, the CIS has become a weak organization that 
operates mostly ceremonially and a glorified discusion forum; but it has neither 
impacted Russian or Central-Asian energy policy nori c eased Russian influence on 
energy relations with the region. Where the CIS hasfailed to become an influential 
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organization, the Russians hoped that absorbing non-Soviet actors into future Eurasian 
organizations would achieve post-Soviet Central Asian influence for Russia. 
Shortly after the establishment of CIS, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) was established on October 7, 1992 establishing a regional military 
alliance binding former Soviet republics in the Cauc sus, Central Asia and Belarus 
similar to NATO or the former Warsaw Pact.5 The CSTO was created from the structure 
of the CIS, and CIS states signed the “CIS Collectiv  Security Treaty” (CST) from May 
1992 through December 31, 1993.6 The treaty went into force on April 20, 1994, and the
treaty agreement between the states was transformed into a fully independent military 
alliance in 2002, becoming the CSTO.7 The transition from the Collective Security Treaty 
to the CSTO resulted in the withdrawal of three forme  members. Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Uzbekistan refused to participate in extending the terms of the treaty, which paved 
the way for the establishment of the CSTO.8 Along with Uzbekistan’s withdrawal, 
Turkmenistan also has refused to be a part of the CSTO. The remaining four Central-
Asian states remain full members. 
After the “Andijon Massacre” of 2005, Uzbekistan joined the CSTO shortly after 
expelling the United States from its territory and started its détente with Russia, in 
military relations as well as energy relations. With the winding down of American and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan, Russia had appeared to score a major victory over the 
United States in Russia’s sphere of interest; moreover, at the CSTO meeting in 2011 in 
Moscow, Russia won a motion that would prevent the creation of a new foreign military 
base in a CSTO state without unanimous approval of ll CSTO members. This means that 
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Russia has a veto on the development of any new American, Chinese or other foreign 
military base in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.9 
Russia’s ability to bring together various Central Asian states in military matters 
may not appear to affect energy relations, but Russia’s maneuvers in the military sphere 
have the potential to produce massive benefits for Russia’s energy strategy in the region. 
Preventing non-CSTO powers like the U.S. or China from establishing military bases 
assures Russia that it will have an upper hand if a Central Asian state would want to 
antagonize Russia by threatening to reduce Russian influence or a member state’s 
reliance on Russia. They can do this in many ways such as by demanding Russia to 
renegotiate natural-gas contracts in order to make them more favorable to Central-Asian 
states, by inviting non-Russian engineering and energy firms to operate in the country, by 
establishing closer bilateral relations with neighboring states and by developing new 
pipeline routes that bypass or reduce the Russian influence within the state. In the event 
of an energy dispute between Russia and a Central-Asi n state, attracting and installing 
non-Russian foreign military cooperation in Central Asia would reduce the likelihood 
that Russia would retaliate on a Central-Asian state for undermining Russian energy 
interests. 
More aggressive engagement, from embargoes to military engagement, with a 
Central Asian state with a foreign military presenc would jeopardize Russian interests 
substantially as it would not only be attacking the Central-Asian state but also the foreign 
military power inside it. Russia cannot afford risking a conflict with countries like China 
or the United States that would have military presence in the region. Russia and the rest 
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of the CSTO could pursue legal procedures, such as appealing to international arbitration, 
to resolve the problem; but without means to carry out punishment against “disloyal” 
states, Russia could not effectively stop a Central Asian state from undermining Russian 
interests once it has relations with a foreign military power. This situation makes Russia’s 
CSTO veto against foreign militaries in the region essential to maintaining its influence 
there. 
This set of circumstances has contributed to a couple of states to defy Russia 
either by postponing agreements to allow Russians to use Central Asian military bases to 
pulling out of CSTO altogether. Although not a major energy producer, CSTO member 
Tajikistan has become so disappointed with Russia’s veto in the CSTO that it has begun 
to negotiate aggressively in renewing Russia’s basing r ghts throughout the country 
despite being extremely vulnerable to unrest in Afghanistan, especially with U.S. 
withdrawal, and to energy imports from Kazakhstan and Russia.10 One explanation would 
be that Tajikistan has been indirectly negotiating with the U.S. for allowing access to 
Tajik bases despite violating CSTO guidelines.11 
In addition, Tajikistan has also been in talks with C ina about giving China to its 
territory for building railway networks and pipeline networks from Xinjiang, Western 
China to oil fields in northwest Afghanistan. These projects could obligate China to 
preserve peace and security not only with its potential energy-upstream interests in 
Afghanistan but also in Tajikistan were it to become a transit hub for Chinese interests. 
This future scenario would require Tajikistan to vilate Russian and CSTO agreements 
not to have foreign military presence either on bases or in other capacities. Furthermore, 
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it is unlikely that Russia would use its military presence in Tajikistan to compel the host 
government to abandon projects with China and Afghanist n, especially since active 
engagement against Tajikistan would antagonize China a d much of the international 
community, which would decimate Russia’s agenda in Central Asia as well as other 
energy engagements around the world because the regional and global backlash against 
Russia could compel the region to build relationship  with the U.S., China and other 
states at a much faster pace than if Russia were to yi ld to foreign influence. 
Uzbekistan has become more emphatic of its desire not to be under this Russian 
veto when in late June 2012 the country declared that i  was withdrawing from the CSTO 
only after joining the organization in 2006. Under the same reasons that prompted 
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty, Uzbekistan left 
CSTO because it wanted the freedom to determine its security and military relationships 
with foreign powers without Russian or regional interference. In fact, President Karimov 
had refused to participate in annual summits or in CSTO military exercises in recent 
years.12 Like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan is most likely to negotiate with the 
U.S. to arrange a basing agreement that would invite American forces into the country. 
Without CSTO entanglements, Uzbekistan would not have ny legal barriers between 
Russia or between Central-Asian states and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, like Tajikistan and 
other Central Asian states, Karimov is likely looking to China for future military 
collaboration. Russia, however, will only watch as Uzbekistan pulls away from the 
Russian sphere of influence. 
As these two examples show, Russia has been unable to d velop the CIS or the 
CSTO to neutralize Central Asia’s desire or ability to wean itself from Russian 
                                                 




dominance. The main reason for these failures is that Russia was unable to execute 
punitive measures over most of these periphery states. With the arrival of powers like 
China and the U.S. having energy, economic and, sometimes, military, presences in the 
region with the prospect of increased cooperation, Russia cannot avoid the potential of 
upsetting foreign powers when their operations in the region are affected by Russian 
maneuvers intended to assail a Central-Asian governm nt. Aside from its inability to use 
these regional organizations to protect its authoriy over Central Asia, Russia has tried to 
work with its neighbor, China, to accommodate a rising power that is spreading into 
Russia’s orbit while maintaining a sizable influenc in the region. 
Russia and its Use of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
The idea for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) originated from 
China; but the Russians believed that the SCO would provide Russia with a means to 
bring Central Asia together, like CSTO, in one grand strategy and to control China’s rise 
in the region while preserving Russia’s influence there in the name of “mutual 
cooperation” in the region. Despite having most funding and operations originate from 
China, Russia was able to achieve some political victories, such as the declaration in 
2005 in which the SCO demanded the shutting down of all U.S. military bases in Central 
Asia, including Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, led by both Russia and China.13 Russia 
and China have also joined forces on developing mechanisms on what China calls the 
“three evils”: terrorism, extremism and separatism, which threaten the interests of Russia 
and China.14 Overtime, however, the SCO has fallen short of being a vehicle to revive 
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Russia’s regional dominance by checking China’s rise or to bolster regional support of 
Russian energy and general foreign policy. 
Post-Soviet Russia’s record of using of the SCO to bring Central Asia into 
Moscow’s influence, especially in energy affairs, has been unsuccessful. With the 
inclusion of China and without Russia’s ability to supersede the authority of China or the 
collection of its Central-Asian members, Russia hasd great difficulties in pursuing 
energy policy in the SCO that is disproportionately advantageous to Russia. For most of 
the last decade, Russia’s energy strategy is executed mostly through Russia’s oil and gas 
firms, like Gazprom and Rosneft, and bilateral relations between Russia and each Central 
Asian state. In effect, from the lack of strategic energy opportunities within SCO, Russia 
had to trust in its national energy firms, its bilater l relations in the energy ministry and 
other forms of international outreach that failed to unite the region into one broader 
Russian energy strategies. Instead, it turned into a series of conflicting bilateral schemes. 
Because Russia could not merge regional energy policy, the backbone to its 
economy and its political legitimacy, Russia would not have been able to have any 
meaningful progress in military, broader economic or p litical relations that would serve 
as strengthening Russia’s regional position at the expense of China, the U.S. or other 
foreign states. As a result, Putin and Russia have embarked on new strategy to merge the 
region together that would officially shut out China and only allow the former Central-
Asian Soviet satellites. 
The Customs Union and Eurasian Union 
Russia’s two new organizations, the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union, are 
the country’s latest attempts and the most overt signs of Russia’s intentions to reestablish 
its unquestioned influence in Central Asia. The Custom  Union consists of only Belarus, 
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Russia and Kazakhstan with the potential addition of Ukraine in the future.15 The 
Eurasian Union is a proposed political union of Russia, Belarus and all Central-Asian 
states except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.16 The Customs Union is a more integrated 
economic union than the Eurasian Union because existing transactional tariffs and taxes 
are reduced more than what would be possible in the o r bloc.17 The Eurasian Union, 
meanwhile, plans to become a forum to be a broader economic and political organization 
that seeks cooperation and the establishment of a free-trade zone.18 Nonetheless, both 
organizations are designed to tie the smaller former Soviet satellites to Russia using 
incentives more than intimidation. 
This time, these organizations are designed to provide incentives for Central 
Asian states to have trade and commerce with Russia with reduced or removed customs 
duties and other reforms that have the intention to reinvigorate Russia’s economic and 
hegemonic advantage over its Central-Asian neighbors. These tactics include establishing 
region-wide reduced or removed customs duties, added royalties and payments for oil 
and gas exports through the Russian energy-trade infrastructure and more integrated 
energy and general economic trade with Russia’s trade network. 
Unfortunately, for Russia, unlike the economic system during the Soviet Union, 
the Customs and Eurasian Unions have few effective mechanisms to discourage or to 
punish economic or trading activity by its members against the interests of the Russian-
led economic unions. In fact, Russian aggression through any union would likely be 
                                                 
15 “Customs union, common economic space to underlie Eurasian union – Putin.” RIANovosti, 4 Oct. 2011, 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20111004/167361651.html.  
16 “Putin says deal on Eurasian Economic Union must be ready by 2013.” RIANovosti, 19 May 2011, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110519/164123753.html. 
17 Kramer, Andrew. “Russia and 2 Neighbors Form Economic Union.” The New York Times, 5 July 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/business/global/06customs.html. 
18 Cutler, Robert M. “Putin Declares ‘Eurasian Union’ Goal of Russian Foreign Policy.” EconoMonitor, 25 
Oct. 2011. 
 91 
countered with collective resistance from the Central Asian states with China providing, 
at least, concealed support. In the short term, as much of Central Asia remains reliant on 
the Russian energy system to supply energy to the region as well as to transport some oil 
and gas supply abroad, Russian corrective actions through the Eurasian or Customs 
Unions would have some impact on Russia’s neighbors, but this would only incentivize 
Central Asian states to diversify away from Russia and engage more with China and with 
Central-Asian neighbors. Also, heightened Russian actions against the region under 
authority of the unions would most likely provide opportunities for foreign states, like the 
U.S. or India, to improve economic, political and military relations at the expense of 
Russia. In effect, Russian sanctions or other aggression through any post-Soviet Russian 
union with the region would further create the determination in the region to reduce their 
exposure to Russian punishment by engaging independntly with the rest of the world. 
Moreover, these Unions may create a situation in which Russia may become more 
reliant on the “periphery” states in order for these compacts to remain relevant. For 
example, prospective member Ukraine and established member Kazakhstan are currently 
in the both unions and energy relations between them are dependent on Russian 
pipelines; but they can use Russia’s infrastructure o its advantage over Russia; but it 
would require continued diversification of their resp ctive energy infrastructures. This 
would be easier achieved in Kazakhstan than in Ukraine, but this goal is possible in the 
next few decades. For example, if Ukraine were to manage to develop domestic supplies 
of gas from shale and conventional resources and to imp rt extra supplies from pipelines 
around Russia, then the country and the European network could be less vulnerable to a 
supply shock from a shut off. For Kazakhstan, if the country can continue to construct 
pipelines outside Russia, it would develop fields without the need of Russian help, to 
reduce its need for Russian imports to east Kazakhst n and to develop domestic refining 
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and supply infrastructure inside the country, then its clout against Russia is increased 
considerably. 
The early phases of both the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union render an 
early verdict on their success untenable, but the lik lihood of their success through 
Russian maneuvers and strategy is remote. For these n w organizations to work to 
Russia’s advantage, a myriad of economic and politica  factors would have to shift 
towards Russia’s favor and against the other states’ interests in order to compel these 
states to cooperate with Russia. Like with the CIS and the CSTO, members of the 
Eurasian and Customs Unions are not obligated to have exclusive relations with Russia 
nor will Russia have the ability to reduce forcibly economic relations between Central 
Asia and the international community. Furthermore, they are unlikely to submit 
voluntarily to any union with Russia that could potentially place them in a submissive 
position to Russia and limit their opportunities within the global economy. The assertions 
that the Customs Union or the Eurasian Union significantly caging Central Asian region 
back into Russia’s orbit are not consistent with the goals and opportunities by which to 
integrate the region with the global economy and to place it in the best position. Russia, 
therefore, will most likely have great difficulty restoring its past dominance in this region 
through these political-economic schemes. 
Russia’s Ongoing Passion to Preserve Central-Asian I fluence 
One suspected motivation to develop organizations like the Custom’s Union or 
the Eurasian Union is Russia’s infatuation with the growing “infiltration” of Chinese and 
American influence in the region. Such grave concer over its “backyard” has made 
many in the Russian government that it will lose completely its control of its Central-
Asian “sphere of privileged interests” and have its global position irreparably damaged.  
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To spur these fears, Russian experts have alleged that, from their controlling stakes of 
energy field in Kazakhstan alone, Americans already “control” around 77.4% of all 
Kazakh oil and gas production.19 For the Russians, the relationship between Kazakhst n 
and American IOCs is something that Russia cannot match due to technological and 
engineering deficiencies that also appear in the rest of Central Asia. Without means to 
compete with the global energy community in this manner, Russia has resorted to other 
means to undermine Kazakh and regional energy policy but mainly through indirect 
means, like clever diplomacy and strategy in the 1990s and creating Customs Unions 
with Kazakhstan. 
The rivalry between the U.S. and Russia in the region spreads well beyond the 
energy realm, passing through the political, broader economic and military sectors; and 
Russia has focused its intentions to these three segments. For example, Russians are 
deeply concerned that Afghanistan could become a permanent American military 
installation, despite the American/NATO drawdown of forces and the Russian-American 
collaboration in the Northern Defense Network (NDN) that provides the United States a 
logistical mechanism to deliver supplies to Afghanistan through Russian territory. In 
addition, Russia continues to worry that Kyrgyzstan will continue to allow the Americans 
to use the Manas Air Force Base north of Bishkek and that Uzbekistan will continue its 
cooperation with the Americans on military matters, e pecially since the country has 
pulled out of CSTO and, effectively, freed itself from regulations that restricted American 
presence in CSTO states. Russia’s leaders believes that America’s public commitment to 
combat terrorism in Central Asia and Afghanistan are overstated and that the U.S. wants 
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more destabilization in order to help compel southern Central Asian states to allow added 
American presence in the region. 
THE IMPACT OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Based on an Indian-Kazakh joint report, as one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world, India and its population of 1.2 billion will need massive amounts of new 
energy supply from many different sources. Thought in this report to be the sixth largest 
global energy consumer, the country will need to increase its annual energy consumption 
by 5% to sustain GDP growth at 7 to 8 percent annually.20 To resolve their energy 
challenge, Indian officials have looked towards Central Asia to supply not only in 
supplying future Indian energy demand but also to exploit the energy relationship to build 
new partnerships with Central Asia in other sectors like military and manufacturing.21  
India has been a strong proponent of a north to south “Energy Highway” from 
Russia through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan into Kashmir, bypassing 
Pakistan entirely by straddling the border between India and China, ultimately entering 
India proper.22 Indians fear that allowing any pipeline to pass through Pakistan would 
leave open sabotage or acts of terrorism on it in what is still a volatile region in the world. 
Beyond the Central-Asian dimension of Indian energy cooperation, India has been 
considering an energy future with the region combined with what is labeled as “Pan-
Asian Solidarity” in which Central Asian energy infrastructure would, ideally, combine 
with India, Iran, South Asia, Russia from Siberia to the east, the Far East and Southeast 
Asia. India would greatly benefit from this continental cooperation as it would secure 
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necessary energy supply for this century and beyond.23 In addition, Central Asian states 
would greatly benefit from this energy plan as they would be center of the logistical 
labyrinth connecting suppliers with consumers, mainly residing in India and China.  
Also, India has expressed its support for the “North-South Transport Corridor” 
that is similarly ambitious in its goals and its scope of involvement. This project, which is 
in its planning stages since at least the mid-2000s, includes the transmission of energy as 
well as other goods not only between Central Asia and India but also among regions 
spanning from Russia through Middle-Eastern states, South Asia and Southeast Asia.24 
By constructing new pipelines and railroads, this elaborate project would also secure 
India’s energy future that would integrate both Central Asia and South Asia. Given the 
political and economic realities, however, these and other future transport plans unlikely 
to manifest completely in the foreseeable future. 
Nonetheless, India has been cooperating with Central-Asi n states, especially 
Kazakhstan, in other sectors outside energy to promote cooperation with both regions that 
would transfer into the energy realm once the conditions are ripe and appropriate for 
constructive cooperation. For example, other industries in which trade between 
Kazakhstan and India include metallurgy, cotton, fertilizers, chemicals, medicine and 
teas; however, one major challenge remains transport costs, due to the substantial 
inconvenience of hauling freight from India northward, making air shipments one of the 
major obstacles to trade flourishing between the two regions.25 These major logistical 
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challenges render projects like the North-South corrid  exceedingly important in order 
for Central Asia and South Asia to develop effective energy cooperation. 
In diplomatic relations, India has been very supportive of Indian efforts to resolve 
the Kashmir crisis and to improve relations with Pakistan. Needing peace south of its 
region, Kazakhstan is interested in a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict, as well 
as in Afghanistan. This is one reason why Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states 
have been welcoming India and Pakistan in the SCO as well as greater collaboration in 
the region’s efforts to combat terrorism, separatism and illegal trafficking, issues that 
South Asia is struggling against in its own backyard. Central Asian states understand that 
out of the legacy and emerging world powers that makeup Asia, India is cautious to 
engage the region without worrying about a “great-power” struggle that, according to 
many observers, has characterized the Russia’s and China’s strategies in the region, 
which is more strategically mature than India’s engagement. 
India’s interest in the region has reinvigorated some projects that had remained 
dormant for many years. The most notable revived project is the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Natural-Gas Pipelin  from Amu Darya through 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in which all three latter states will be able to withdraw 
supplies to their respective markets. Senior Pakistni  are on record stating that they want 
the pipeline to become a “symbol of regional peace,” and an initial agreement between all 
sovereign parties had been achieved in December 2010.26 Security issues, especially 
regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and the uncertain future 
of the region in relation to America’s policy shifts, has halted the construction of the 
pipeline from commencing, but this snag has not stopped Central Asian states from 
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Monitoring, 24 Dec 2010. 
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signing deals of their own with South Asia on their own accord, knowing the logistical 
and security challenges that await them. 
Turkmenistan in 2010 initiated a dialogue with Pakistan and Afghanistan to 
increase energy cooperation. In reiterating its policy of neutrality in foreign affairs, 
Turkmenistan stated that “neutrality is not just a legal status” but also “a full-scale 
involvement in international processes through…assisting in working out effective 
models of economic cooperation.”27 As much as Turkmenistan is projecting “neutrality,” 
the country is pursuing a more assertive, self-regulating approach to engaging its 
neighbors, especially in the diplomatically less powerful nations of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as opposed to states like China. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also shown the 
urge to sign deals with India on energy affairs without the assistance of, authorization 
from or intimidation by multilateral organizations or more powerful neighbors like China 
or Russia.28 Continued cooperation with India, despite the challenges and walls that 
prevent complete cooperation, can potentially create the foundations for more robust 
relations in the event that energy relations between C ntral and South Asia can become a 
significant portion of their respective energy policies. 
THE IRAN FACTOR  
The relationship between Central Asia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is a 
peculiar one because Central Asia, since gaining its independence, has looked for 
opportunities for trade and energy cooperation with the country while promoting good 
relations with it in order to take advantage of its auspicious geographical position as a 
bridge between the Middle East and South Asia as well as being a littoral state to the 
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Caspian Sea. Conversely, Iran serves as a competitor to Central Asian interests as it 
remains one of Russia’s strongest allies, including ts attempts to prevent the 
development of hydrocarbons in the Caspian, and, despite crippling sanctions against it, 
one of the largest exporters of hydrocarbons to India and China, which bypass sanctions 
intended to prevent such energy trade, undermining Central-Asian attempts to increase its 
energy exports. 
Though Central-Asian states are willing to overlook Iran’s behavior that would 
undermine Central-Asia’s energy policy abroad, the region does not wish to catch the ire 
of the U.S. and Europe, which have many energy and e gineering IOCs located 
throughout the region and can compel them to decrease or to halt completely all activity 
in the area, which would send the energy infrastructure into a crisis and would weaken its 
diplomatic relations with the Western world. Given Iran’s defiance in the wake of 
international sanctions on energy exports, financial transactions and political restrictions, 
Central Asia is not in a position to defy much of the global community in engaging with 
the country, especially since helping the country would ironically assist in promoting 
Iranian policies and proposals that are undermining Central Asian energy relations. 
Iran has been working with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union to preserve 
treaty agreements and other forms of international law that designates the Caspian Sea as 
a legally defined “lake” rather than a “sea.”29  The other three littoral states Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would rather have the Caspian defined as a sea so they can 
build pipelines through the Caspian without Russian authorization. The difference in 
legal interpretation has major ramifications to the future of developing deepwater 
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offshore resources in the Caspian Sea by those stats hat want the Caspian legally 
defined as a “sea.”  
According to Dash, if the Caspian were defined as a “ ea,” then the Caspian 
would be divided into five jurisdictions allocated according to many factors including 
amount of Caspian coastline a state controls as well as the distance from one state to 
another, so as to provide the fairest division of the Caspian.30 In this setup, states like 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan would be free to explore and to develop 
hydrocarbon resources, including transportation infrastructure like pipelines, within its 
own jurisdiction under its own authority without needing the authorization or consolation 
of other littoral states. Essentially, states like Iran and Russia would be helpless in 
stopping energy development of hydrocarbons in Russian territory lost after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. If the Caspian were defined as a “lake,” then the entire Caspian would not 
be allocated according to territory and location of state jurisdiction in relation to the 
Caspian. The entire body of water would have “collectiv  ownership” of water and 
hydrocarbon rights, which would allow states like Russia and Iran most probably to have 
a de facto veto over the development of hydrocarbons u der the auspices of former-
Soviet states.31 In this situation, Russia would still retain much control of the 
development of the Caspian that it had during the Soviet Union. 
This sharp disagreement over defining the Caspian will unlikely have a 
breakthrough in the foreseeable future if the current geopolitical situation continues 
around the Caspian region. No matter if and how Central Asian states will engage with 
Iran, the region will be unable to convince the current Iranian regime to change its stance 
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on the Caspian Sea in favor of the region because Iran still regards Russia as a staunch 
ally with its significant arms shipments, meaningful collaboration with Iranian efforts in 
nuclear technology and diplomatic support of the regim  in the international community, 
defying Western and American efforts to undermine th  regime. If Iran were to betray 
Russia on the Caspian issue, the country places in j opardy all of these other relationships 
and advantages that it would not be able to get from any other state or a collection thereof 
without changing the fundamental nature of the Islamic Republic. Without radical regime 
or otherwise ideological change, the Islamic Republic will remain the key block to 
Central Asian prospects to having a more unified Caspian policy, better trade relations 
between the east and west Caspian and easier access to We tern markets. 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Central Asia’s future and its relations with the grat powers of China, Russia, the 
U.S. and India along with other countries like Iran is impossible to predict effectively; 
therefore this section will provide various scenarios that will shape the key outer actors in 
the region and how Central Asian states can adjust to possible future developments in the 
global geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. This is not an exhaustive list of 
scenarios. 
Potential for Russia  
For Russia, their ability to maintain influence in the region is heavily reliant on 
whether the Central-Asian periphery, especially in China and India, will be too 
economically or politically unstable for Central-Asian investment and collaboration with 
the outer world. If this scenario were to occur, then Russia would need to ensure that their 
domestic political and economic situations remain stable enough to encourage continued 
energy relations with Central Asian states, especially on the advent of the Customs and 
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Eurasian Unions. For example, with economic stagnatio  in India and in China, it would 
be cheaper for Central Asian states to sell their ene gy assets through the Russian energy-
pipeline system since Russia would purchase them at uch cheaper prices and resell 
them to customers in Europe or domestically at higher prices while preserving their own 
energy reserves, which saves on production costs and allows for Russian oil and gas to be 
saved for times when energy prices are much higher in order to make upstream-
operations costs more economical for Russia. 
During this time of coerced cooperation with Russia, Central Asian states in the 
Eurasian Union would be pressured to ratifying long-term contracts with Russia not only 
in the energy space but also in other sectors, like the military or manufacturing, or with 
commitments, such as guaranteeing basing rights for Russia and having Central-Asian 
states have legally defined preferential treatment for Russia. Central Asian states, without 
another economic partner to turn to, would be pressur d to accepting long-term contracts 
with Russia to solve a short-term threat of decreased energy revenues. For Central Asia, 
since states would remain heavily reliant on energy revenues for stability and political 
credibility, they would be compelled to agree to pacts that they would not otherwise sign. 
Such contracts could include reducing the payments Russia would pay to Central Asian 
states for buying their gas or transporting it through their pipeline networks. Russia also 
can increase its oil and gas purchases from Central Asi  at a cheaper price not only to 
take advantage of the desperate times but also reduce the amount of remaining reserves 
Central-Asian states would have to export to states lik  China or India. In case China and 
India experience stagnation or, even, deep recession, Russia will definitely benefit from 
this development and draw Central-Asian states deeper into its orbit. 
When other economies recover and demand more energy, China and India would 
very likely encourage Central Asian states to reneg on their new obligations with Russia 
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and the Eurasian Union. If Central Asia were to break on their obligations without 
Russian authorization, Russia would certainly seek r prisal; but would be limited on the 
particular means to carry out punishment and would need to pressure the entire Eurasian 
Union to follow through on punishing transgressions by a member state. Russia, for its 
part, could not resort to military means but only to political pressure and economic 
sanctions, including in the energy sector. 
In a hypothetical case, if Turkmenistan decided to build a pipeline and export of 
natural gas to India that would necessarily reduce exports to Russia under Eurasian-
Union contracts and treaties, then the whole organization would be obliged to pressure 
Turkmenistan not to follow through on their agreement with India or, even, punish 
Turkmenistan for its contraventions. With its geographical position and its economic 
dominance among Central-Asian states, Kazakhstan would be the most pivotal Central-
Asian state for determining the effectiveness of such Eurasian Union sanctions.  
If Kazakhstan were to follow Russia’s and the Union’s orders, then Turkmenistan 
would be cut off effectively not only from export routes to Russia but also possibly from 
pipeline routes that send oil and gas to China, like the Central Asia-China pipeline. 
Though extending Turkmenistan’s punishments to Chinese pipelines would be dangerous 
since Kazakhstan would worry about unrest in Xinjiang if they lose energy imports, this 
maneuver would have a much stronger impact on Turkmenistan. China would certainly 
protest, but as long as the other Eurasian Union states can compensate for the loss of 
Turkmen exports without interruptions, China and Xinjiang will not show outrage but 
will likely remain disappointed that the region cannot be free from such discord. Since 
Turkmenistan would not have the finances to fund the new project nor the time to bear 
the sanctions, the country would very likely abandon their plans with India. 
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If Kazakhstan decided not help Russia punish Turkmenistan then Russia would be 
obligated to punish both states to maintain the intgri y of the union. Since Kazakhstan is 
still reliant on Russian energy imports to meet oil and gas demand in Astana and Almaty, 
without changes to the country’s energy infrastructure to Astana and Almaty, Kazakhstan 
would be in severe risk of having an energy crisis in its population centers. If Kazakhstan 
can build pipeline infrastructure from the Caspian to its east, then this type of punishment 
from Russia would have less impact. 
If the obedient members of the region were to work together to undermine 
Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan politically or economically, this would make the entire 
region more susceptible to complete instability. As Turkmenistan would not have the 
means to retaliate effectively, Kazakhstan would be left to prevent region-wide action 
against it. Kazakhstan can restrict financial outflws to the rest of the region and can cut 
off energy pipelines from its territory to population centers in the rest of the region. With 
the tension already intense in the Fergana Valley, an energy-supply shortage may send 
the region back into severe instability and even civil war. Understanding this scenario, if 
Kazakhstan were faced with regional retaliation for its support of an energy policy that 
undermines the Eurasian Union, the country would most likely not risk regional 
instability and, instead, will follow with Russia. Kazakhstan’s decision-making process, 
however, would need more analysis; but this scenario shows that Russia’s use of the 
Eurasian Union to control Central-Asian behavior could be effective. 
Advent of New Technologies 
As new energy technologies such as shale gas or renewable energy become 
economical enough to replace a significant portion of oil and gas demand, then Central 
Asia could suffer lost demand for its products. As China potentially has massive amounts 
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of natural gas embedded in shale, China would reduce its demand for Central-Asian 
energy. With its shale supply in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Northeastern Germany and 
elsewhere, Europe would not need to construct costly pipeline projects from the Caspian 
area. India would not have the shale supplies that China or Europe would have, and 
would continue to need new supplies from Central Asia; but with the added global natural 
gas supply that shale would create, the prices that Cen ral Asia would sell to India would 
be much less than without shale gas. 
If renewable energy becomes a major source of energy in the future, Central Asia 
would have reduced demand for its natural gas, but co ld compensate some of this loss 
with installations of wind and solar farms throughout the region. Kazakhstan has one of 
the most variable climates in the world with high winds in many areas in the country.32 
Turkmenistan, with its vast expanse of uninhabited land, could be a source of solar 
energy, but not for wind power, as it is most economical in inaccessible mountainous 
areas.33 Uzbekistan would be an excellent location for solar power but not for wind 
power.34 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also have high solar energy potential.35 Having the 
auspicious wind and solar potential in the region, Central Asia, therefore, could be a 
source of renewable energy in the future if the technology becomes more economical or 
if the region needs to introduce the technology if oil and gas revenues decline. 
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Afghanistan as the Gateway to the South Asian Energy Markets 
Russia and China have different priorities and want different outcomes in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan for their regional energy strategies to succeed. For Russia, it 
would prefer to have the country descend into chaos, especially after the vast majority of 
American forces withdraw from the region. This would deter investment in the country 
and would decrease the possibility of pipeline construction through Afghanistan since 
neither the country nor the international community can assure that any new projects 
would be protected from sabotage. China is increasing energy and mining operations in 
the country, and would not want terrorism or instability to jeopardize the viability of their 
enterprises, which include pipeline projects from the country to Western China. China’s 
interests, therefore, are aligned with Central-Asia’s interests to build pipelines, like TAPI, 
through the country; and both China and the region w uld likely work together to ensure 
that Afghanistan remains stable for pipeline construction and economic development. 
China, Russia and Central Asia also have a similar strategic view of Pakistan. 
Russia would not want Pakistan, an unstable country i  the opinion of many observers, to 
have the economic or political environment to promote pipeline and energy development 
in the country. From the southern region of Baluchistan to northern tribal stronghold of 
Waziristan, in many ways, Pakistan is a much more challenging environment than 
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as previously shown, Central Asia and China remain mostly 
undeterred. For its part, China is increasing its military and economic collaboration with 
Pakistan, most notably with its ports in Gwadar on the Pakistani coast that laps the 
Arabian Sea near the Persian Gulf; so China is deeply interested in maintaining a stable 
Pakistan in the south and in the north, where its capital Islamabad is located. Central Asia 
can parlay China’s interests to have a stable, tranquil Pakistan that would be able to 
accommodate pipeline development in addition to other projects. 
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Russia certainly would prefer that Pakistan remain volatile enough so that energy 
projects remain impractical so that Central Asia has one less outlet to bypass Russia. If 
Central Asia is not able to develop pipelines in Pakist n to send energy throughout South 
Asia, then Russia would benefit because the region w uld be forced into the status quo 
through reliance on its northern neighbor for accommodating exports. Russia would 
unlikely interfere with Pakistani affairs to force this scenario to happen because through 
its obligations in the SCO, CSTO and the NDN, in addition to its determination not to 
have any potential for instability in Central Asia, Russia would not prefer to send 
Pakistan into severe chaos. 
If pipeline construction is possible in Afghanistan d Pakistan, then India would 
need to maintain economic growth and national politica  stability sufficient to allow 
pipeline construction to reach the most lucrative en rgy markets in South Asia, especially 
New Delhi and Mumbai. Central Asia would need to achieve this objective without major 
assistance from China, as its interests in energy and tr de with India are less important to 
Chinese strategy than with Pakistan. Being a much larger economy with added financial 
resources to finance such a project, India is likely to work together with Central Asia 
without a third party. Russia could work with China to undermine such a project but 
would likely not risk instability or negative consequences from such efforts. 
Possibility of Iran Opening to the West 
As Iran is the most formidable barrier outside of Russia that can stifle Central 
Asian energy development, significant political or economic changes in the country could 
provide momentous transformations for Central Asian energy relations. Russia remains a 
strong Iranian ally in many different sectors outside energy and would be greatly 
weakened globally in many different regards. Since Central Asian states have been 
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resistant to developing broader relations with Iran, mainly from resistance from Europe 
and America, Central Asian interests would likely not be greatly harmed if significant 
changes happen in Iran. If the status quo remains and Ir n remains under the control of 
the Islamic Republic, then Central Asia will continue to have great difficulty with 
engaging with the West by land and through the Caspian. 
In the opposite scenario, a regime change in Iran could bring many outcomes. If 
Iran has its energy infrastructure greatly destroyed during the course of its chaos, then 
Central Asia cannot realistically have Iran as an energy partner since the country would 
be rebuilding long before it could transmit Central-Asian energy. Central Asia has little 
experience with nation building or leading infrastructure projects, so it would not be in a 
position to help Iran. If, however, political changes in Iran are peaceful and the regime 
becomes less loyal to Russia, especially on the Caspian-Sea question, then Central Asia 
could finally have the ability to develop the Caspian Sea without political pressure, 
depending on how Russia engages the south Caspian in this scenario. With changes in 
Iran, Central Asia has little to lose but much to gain. If Russia loses a loyal Iran that 
supports Russia on Caspian-Sea demarcation, then Russia could lose a main barrier to 
Central-Asian energy development westward. 
As shown in the previous scenarios, the evolution of Central Asia’s neighbors and 
of energy technology will be profound but is so farunknown. Central Asia’s former 
hegemons, aspiring partners and stubborn roadblocks to growth show little signs of 
actively changing their policies. Russia remains adamant on preserving its influence. 
South Asia is pursuing deeper relations to their north, and Iran remains Central Asia’s 
barrier to the south. For Central-Asian governments and those that wish to have a 
presence in this region, planning possible scenarios for future Central-Asian engagement 
are paramount for a successful long-term relationship with this region. Whatever the 
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future holds for Central Asia, the region will certainly be greatly influenced by and will 
have profound impact on the world in the twenty-first century. 
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Chapter 6: Closing Remarks 
The states that make up Central Asia struggled to emerge from their Soviet past. 
Their political and economic transitions as independent states have been filled with 
conflict, unrest and uncertainty. Kazakhstan and its president Narsultan Nazarbaev 
became in control of their oil and gas but not of the pipeline routes that send their oil and 
gas abroad and that enable the country’s economy to survive. Turkmenistan, with its 
dictatorial president Niyazov, wanted to project an appearance of “neutrality” so that 
Niyazov could solidify control of the country but resulting in worsening relations with 
Russia and greatly disrupted energy exports. Uzbekistan found itself dealing with the 
security and stability problems of sectarian, ethnic and other forms of extremism that 
were originally Moscow’s responsibility. Other internal and self-inflicting problems, like 
corruption, financial mismanagement and political brinksmanship, have further hampered 
this region from using its energy resources to its full potential. 
This region has the energy resources, geography and existing pipeline 
infrastructure to become a prominent region for globa  energy relations and broader 
global relations. Evolutions from Soviet satellites o fully autonomous, successful states 
take much time to complete; and the political and economic changes in Central Asia have 
been gradual and will often encompass multiple generations. No one should expect any 
Central-Asian state to become a superpower or an energy exporter equal to Russia or 
Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, energy has been the bridge that has compelled the various 
states and other factions to engage Central Asia and to gain strategic geopolitical and 
geoeconomic advantages at the expense of other rivals. 
Though their past may have been closely tied with Russia, Central-Asian states 
have no interest having their national interests, especially their energy reserves, 
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controlled by a faraway power. The twenty-first century represents a unique opportunity 
for these countries to use their sovereignty and resources for the benefit of their own 
societies, which was not even possible for at least a century. Recent developments in this 
region show that the three main energy-reserve stats are eager to work with the 
international community and have sought to diversify and to hedge their political and 
economic circumstances in order to benefit optimally from newfound international 
engagement. 
Regardless of how the world will change in this century, Central Asia will 
certainly be a discrete and integral influence on the political and economic development 
of the international system not only from Central-Asian activities but also from the 
decisions and actions of global powers in and around the region. Greater energy 
cooperation will most likely be a facilitator of closer relationships, like in military or 
diplomatic bonds, that will shape strategy and events throughout Asia in this century; and 
the policies and preferences of Central-Asian state will have much greater impact on the 
future of the international system. Regardless of how Central Asia performs in its first 
few decades as members of the international community, Central Asia will be a crucial 
factor in the strategies of groups, firms, multinational corporations and countries that 
have a presence in Asia, the former Soviet Union and in energy markets. Central Asia’s 
future path is not certain, but, because the region has the ability and the drive to engage 
the world, its energy resources will make Central Asia vital to understanding geopolitics 
and geoeconomics for this century. 
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